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GAME-THEORETIC MODELS
Félix Muñoz-García, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2008
This thesis analyzes how playersrelative evaluation of the actions other agents choose af-
fects individualsstrategic behavior, both in simultaneous and sequential-move games. First,
in The importance of foregone options: generalizing social comparisons in sequential-move
games(joint work with Ana Espinola-Arredondo), we examine a tractable theoretical model
in which every individual compares other players actions with respect to their foregone
choices. We analyze the equilibrium prediction in complete information sequential-move
games, and compare it with that of standard games where players are not concerned about
unchosen alternatives. We show that, without relying on interpersonal payo¤ comparisons
(i.e., assuming strictly individualistic preferences), our model predicts higher cooperation
among the players than standard game-theoretic models. In addition, our framework em-
bodies di¤erent behavioral models, such as those on social status acquisition as special cases.
Finally, we conrm our results in di¤erent economic applications.
In Social comparisons as a cooperating device in simultaneous-move games, I extend
the above setting to simultaneous-move games. Specically, I identify under what conditions
introducing relative comparisons into playerspreferences leads them to be more cooperative
than in standard game-theoretic models. I show that this result holds under certain condi-
tions on the reference point that players use in their relative comparisons (which determines
when a particular action by other agent is considered kind or not) and on whether players
actions become more strategic complementary or substitutable. The model is then applied
to di¤erent examples in public good games which conrm the intuition behind the results.
iii
Finally, in Competition for status acquisition in public good gamesI apply the above
models of social comparisons to the context of status acquisition through contributions to
public goods. I show that the simultaneous contribution order generates higher total con-
tributions than the sequential mechanism only when donors are su¢ ciently homogeneous in
the value they assign to status. Otherwise, the sequential mechanism generates the highest
contributions.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
How do people evaluate each othersactions? How do individuals compare the actions of
others with respect to certain reference points? And more importantly, how do these relative
comparisons a¤ect their strategic behavior?
My research in this Ph.D. Thesis examines how relative comparisons a¤ect individuals
strategic behavior, both in simultaneous and sequential-move games. In particular, I identify
under what conditions we can predict higher degrees of cooperation when individuals assign
a value to relative comparisons than when they do not. Specically, I show that this higher
cooperation holds under certain conditions on the particular reference point that players
use, and on whether players reciprocate or compensate each othersactions (i.e., whether
playersactions become more strategic complementary or substitutable). I then apply this
behavioral model to di¤erent economic contexts, ranging from bargaining games, to labor
market (employer-employee relationship) and public good games; which enhance the intuition
behind my results and suggest further economic applications. Finally, I demonstrate that
this approach embeds several existing behavioral models as special cases: from social status
acquisition to intentions-based reciprocity.
First, in The importance of Foregone Options: generalizing social comparisons in se-
quential move games (joint work with Ana Espinola-Arredondo), we rely on recent ex-
perimental evidence which supports the e¤ect of a players unchosen alternatives on other
individuals actions. For example, Brandts and Solà (2001), Falk et al. (2003) and Charness
and Rabin (2002) accumulate signicant evidence supporting the importance of unchosen al-
ternatives in the ultimatum bargaining game, while Andreoni, Brown and Vesterlund (2002)
show the relevance of unchosen alternatives in public good games. Importantly, these ex-
perimental results cannot be rationalized using existing theories on inequity aversion or
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intentions-based reciprocity, as shown in the paper. Instead, any rationalization of this ob-
served behavior must rely on a players comparison between the actions that the proposer
other individuals choose and those they do not (unchosen actions).
In this study we introduce a model that rationalizes these economic conducts in com-
plete information sequential-move games within a general framework of economic behavior.
Specically, we assume that as in standard models, every player cares about her material
payo¤. Additionally, we consider that every individual compares other playersactually cho-
sen actions with respect to a particular action that they could have selected (other players
foregone actions). Hence, this particular action is used by every individual as a reference
point to measure the kindness she perceives from other playerschoices. We then analyze
the equilibrium prediction in complete information sequential-move games, and compare it
with that of standard games where players are not concerned about unchosen alternatives.
We show that, without relying on interpersonal payo¤ comparisons (i.e., assuming strictly
individualistic preferences), our model predicts higher cooperation among the players than
standard game-theoretic models. In addition, our framework embodies di¤erent behavioral
models, such as those on intentions-based reciprocity and social status acquisition as special
cases. Finally, we conrm our results in three economic applications: the ultimatum bar-
gaining game, the labor market gift exchange game, and the sequential public good game.
In Social comparisons as a cooperating device in simultaneous-move games, I extend
the above setting to simultaneous-move games. Specically, I identify under what conditions
introducing relative comparisons into playerspreferences leads them to be more cooperative
than in standard game-theoretic models. I show that this result holds under certain con-
ditions on the specic reference point that players use in their relative comparisons (which
determines when a particular action by other agent is considered kind or not) and on whether
playersconsideration for relative comparisons leads them to regard each othersactions as
more strategic complementary or substitutable.
Specically, I show that when players consider other playerschoices as relatively kind
and playersactions become more strategically complementary, both players increase their
equilibrium strategies beyond the equilibrium level in standard models. Similarly, this result
is also applicable to the case in which players consider other agentsstrategies as relatively
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unkind but actions become more strategically substitutable. Finally, I demonstrate that
these results are not only valid for games where playersactions are regarded as strategic
complements, but also for those in which these actions are strategic substitutes. Hence,
this paper identies under what conditions playersrelative comparisons (evaluating other
playerskindness) act as a device for cooperation that triggers higher strategy choices on
both players.
Therefore, this papers main contributions can be divided into two. First, from a general
perspective, this paper shows that, under certain conditions, agentsconsideration of relative
comparisons may lead them to increase their actions with respect to those they choose
in standard models (settings where players do make relative comparisons). Importantly,
it examines this result applies even when players are not concerned about other players
material payo¤s. Indeed, unlike models with inequity averse individuals where players do
care about other individuals payo¤s (social preferences), this paper analyzes conditions
under which agents choose higher (or lower) strategy levels than in standard models without
the need to assume that they care about other peoples payo¤s, i.e., even when agents
preferences can be regarded as strictly individualistic.Second, I show that the model this
paper describes embeds as special cases existing behavioral models: from models on inequity
aversion to those analyzing social status acquisition. Hence, this model o¤ers a broader and
more unifying explanation of agentsbehavior than these models alone. The model is then
applied to di¤erent examples in public good games which enhance the intuition behind the
results. Furthermore, I show that many models from the behavioral game theory literature,
such as inequity aversion and social status acquisition, can all be rationalized as special cases
of this model.
In Competition for status acquisition in public good gamesI apply the above models
of social comparisons to the context of public goods, and in particular, I assume that every
donor evaluates other donorscontributions by comparing them with respect to her own. In
this setting, donors hence acquire social status when their own contribution is higher than
that of others. Intuitively, one may expect every donors giving decision to be increasing
in his value for social status, since this valuation might attenuate his incentives to free-ride
on other donorscontributions. This intuitive prediction is indeed conrmed both in the
3
simultaneous solicitation order (where both donors give simultaneously to the charity) and
in its sequential version (in which one donor gives rst and then the other gives second before
the end of the game). Similarly, an individuals contribution should also be increasing in the
value that other donors assign to status. Indeed, since an opponent with a higher value for
status increases his contribution, individuals need to increase their donation to the charity
in order to reduce as much as possible their loss of social status; this is conrmed in our
model for both solicitation orders as well.
In addition, I analyze how total revenues raised by charities are a¤ected by this competi-
tion among donors for higher social status, obtaining that total contributions are increasing
in donorsconcerns about status in both the simultaneous and sequential solicitation orders.
A question of interest is which particular contribution order raises the highest total revenue
to the charity. In particular, I provide a relatively simple answer to this questions which
can be directly applied by practitioners. Specically, populations of relatively homogeneous
donors in terms of the value they assign to status induce a higher competition (and con-
tributions) in the simultaneous public good game than in its sequential version. In contrast,
groups of contributors with heterogeneous values to status submit higher total donations in
the sequential contribution game than in its simultaneous counterpart. Hence, this paper
contributes to the literature on public good games by analyzing which solicitation order
raises the highest total revenue to the charity when players compete for social status.
Finally, I examine the possibility that donors social status might be acquired from
previous donations to the charity, or from any other sources. This is the case, for example,
of famous philanthropists who start their competition for status with previously acquired
levels of social status. In particular, I show that if this previous status enters additively
into donors status concerns, seniority may work as a strategic substitute for the status
donors can acquire through current donations, reducing their contributions. In contrast,
if currently acquired status emphasizes previously acquired rankings, then status acquired
during di¤erent periods work as strategic complements, and current donations are increased.
4
2.0 THE IMPORTANCE OF FOREGONE OPTIONS: GENERALIZING
SOCIAL COMPARISONS IN SEQUENTIAL-MOVE GAMES
Recent advances in behavioral economics allow for the possibility that individuals care about
the payo¤s of others. In particular, most of these advances suggest the existence of social,
as opposed to individual, preferences reecting individualspredilection for fairness in the
income distribution; see Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Despite
the multiple situations that can be rationalized with these approaches, a recent literature
suggests that individuals behavior cannot be explained by theories on social preferences
alone. Specically, an agents choices can only be supported by analyzing how she evaluates
other playerschosen and unchosen actions. For example, Brandts and Solà (2001), Falk
et al. (2003) and Charness and Rabin (2002) accumulate signicant evidence supporting
the importance of unchosen alternatives in the ultimatum bargaining game, while Andreoni,
Brown and Vesterlund (2002) show the relevance of unchosen alternatives in public good
games. In order to illustrate their results, let us briey analyze Brandts and Solàs (2001)
study. In particular, they examine an ultimatum bargaining game in which the proposer is
called to choose among only two alternative divisions of the pie (which we normalize to a
size of one) as the gures below illustrate.
Specically, they consider two treatments. In the rst one, represented in gure 1, the
proposer chooses among two divisions of the pie, (0.2,0.8) and (0.125,0.875)  where the rst
and second component of every pair denote the receiver and proposers payo¤, respectively. In
the second treatment, as gure 2 indicates, the rst available division (0.2,0.8) is unchanged,
while the second division becomes (0.875,0.125). Importantly, they show that, conditional
on division 0.2 being o¤ered to the responder (bold lines in the gures), the proportion
of receivers rejections is signicantly higher when the unchosen division of the pie that
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Proposer
Responder Responder
(0.2, 0.8) (0, 0) (0.125, 0.875)
A AR R
(0.2, 0.8) (0.125, 0.875)
(0, 0)
Figure 1: Responder accepts
Proposer
Responder Responder
(0.2, 0.8) (0, 0) (0.875, 0.125)
A AR R
(0.2, 0.8) (0.875, 0.125)
(0, 0)
Figure 2: Responder rejects
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the proposer did not select was 0.875 (gure 2) than when it was 0.125 (gure 1). That
is, for a given o¤er of 0.2 to the responder, the proportion of rejections increases in the
share of the pie that the responder could have received. Intuitively, the receiver positively
evaluates a given o¤er when the alternative division of the pie is below the actual o¤er
that the proposer makes him (he infers kindness), and negatively otherwise (he interprets
unkindness). Certainly, the receivers pattern of rejections cannot be rationalized using
inequity aversion. Indeed, once the o¤er (0.2,0.8) is made in both treatments, inequity
in the payo¤ distribution is constant across treatments, and yet the receivers behavior
is di¤erent across treatments. The receivers rejecting pattern cannot be explained using
chosen actions either, since the proposers chosen o¤er is constant across treatments but the
receivers behavior is not. Instead, any rationalization of the previous results must rely on
the receivers comparison between the actions that the proposer chooses and those he does
not (unchosen actions).
References to unchosen actions are nevertheless not restricted to economic contexts
alone. For instance, we frequently encounter references to unchosen alternatives in the
way in which many national and international policies are announced to the media. In-
deed, these public presentations are often accompanied with statements like The govern-
ment/organization/rm had to choose between policies A and B, and choosing A would have
been so bad that we better selected B.These statements are certainly e¤ective when they
induce the listener to positively evaluate the chosen action B relative to the unchosen action
A.
In this study we introduce a model that rationalizes this economic conduct in com-
plete information sequential-move games within a general framework of economic behavior.
Specically, we assume that as in standard models, every player cares about her material
payo¤. Additionally, we consider that every individual compares other playersactually cho-
sen actions with respect to a particular action that they could have selected (other players
foregone actions). Hence, this particular action is used by every individual as a reference
point to measure the kindness she perceives from other playerschoices.
This paper makes two main contributions. First, we identify conditions under which
playersequilibrium actions are higher when individuals are concerned about these reference-
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dependent comparisons than when they are not. In particular, this set of conditions allow
for a direct prediction about whether playerscooperation rates when they are concerned
about relative comparisons is either higher or lower than in standard game-theoretic models.
Additionally, it examines playerscooperation rates even when they are not concerned about
each others material payo¤s. Indeed, unlike models with inequity averse individuals where
players do care about other individuals payo¤s (social preferences), this paper analyzes
conditions under which agents choose higher strategy levels than in standard models without
the need to assume that they care about other playerspayo¤s, i.e., agentspreferences can
be regarded as strictly individualistic.Second, we show that the model this paper describes
embeds as special cases existing behavioral approaches: from models on inequity aversion to
those analyzing social status acquisition. Finally, we apply our model to di¤erent economic
applications where we enhance the intuition behind the results: the ultimatum bargaining
game, the labor market gift exchange game, and the sequential public good game. Our
equilibrium predictions are not only validated in these applications, but also conrmed by
recent experimental data.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss the literature
on social preferences and intentions-based reciprocity, their relationship with our paper,
and how it complements their approach. In section three, we describe the properties that
playersutility function must satisfy in order to support our results in terms of higher de-
grees of cooperation. Furthermore, section four analyzes players equilibrium strategy in
these sequential-move games, and section ve applies the model to three economic exam-
ples. Finally, the last section discusses some conclusions of the paper as well as its further
extensions.
2.1 RELATED LITERATURE
2.1.1 Theoretical literature on social preferences
The literature on behavioral economics has extensively considered elements other than ones
own payo¤ in individualsutility function. This literature mainly deals with the so-called
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other regarding preferences, since most of the papers in this area focus their attention
on analyzing to what extent players care about the payo¤s of his competitors, or about
the distribution of payo¤s in the entire population. In this respect, some papers on inequity
aversion, such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) play a prominent
role. On one hand, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) consider in their two-player version the following
utility function for player i
Ui(xi; xj) = xi   imaxfxj   xi; 0g   imaxfxi   xj; 0g
where xi is player is payo¤. Intuitively, i represents the disutility from allocations that
are disadvantageously unequal for player i (i.e., he may feel envy about player js payo¤s),
while i denotes the guilt feeling from being the agent with the highest payo¤ of the pop-
ulation.1 Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) also develop a similar (yet more general) model of
inequity aversion in which individualsutility is assumed to be increasing and concave in
their share of total income, i.e., people experience a positive but diminishing marginal util-
ity from receiving a higher share of the total amount of social payo¤s. These models of social
preferences, however, cannot rationalize the puzzling experimental evidence presented in the
introduction.2 Indeed, any model which explains such results must necessarily complement
the above specication by introducing the importance of unchosen alternatives into player
is utility function, as this paper examines.3
1Interestingly, Blanco et al (2007) present experimental evidence supporting inequity aversion at the
aggregate level (across all participants of a particular game) but refuting it at the individual level (for a
given participant across games). Their results can be conrmed by our model, whereby participants of
a particular game exhibit concerns for unchosen alternatives, but they may use di¤erent foregone options
across games as a reference point for comparison.
2Another interesting experimental paper that also tests whether payo¤ distributions su¢ ce to explain
playersbehavior in the ultimatum bargaining game is Bereby-Meyer and Niederle (2005). Specically, they
show that the responder is more likely to reject low o¤ers when a rejection payo¤ is accrued to a third
player  with no strategic role in the ultimatum bargaining game than when such payo¤ is accrued to the
proposer.
3Some axiomatic approaches, such as Segal and Sobel (1999), examine what conditions on playerspref-
erences must be satised in order to obtain utility functions which can be represented as a weighted average
of a players own material payo¤ as well as that of others. Despite their interest, our approach di¤ers from
theirs, since we not only include playersactually chosen actions in their utility function (as they do), but
also playersunchosen actions.
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2.1.2 Models on intentions-based reciprocity
As suggested above, this paper is more in the line of Charness and Rabin (2002), whereby
they analyze the intentions that players express with their actual choices along the game.
In particular, they assume that agents evaluate multiple characteristics of the equilibrium
allocation  including fairness and intentions by establishing di¤erent comparisons be-
tween own and social payo¤s (i.e., between xi and xj). Specically, when only intentions are
considered, agent is utility function in Charness and Rabins (2002) model reduces to
Ui(xi; xj) =
8<: xi + (xi   xj) if player j misbehavedxi otherwise
where player js misbehavior can implicitly include player is concern about player js
foregone options, and where  represents the importance of intentions-based reciprocity for
player i. Note, however, that player is disutility from player js misbehavior is scaled
up by the di¤erence between player i and js payo¤s, xi   xj. Certainly, this confounds
the elements triggering such perception of misbehavior (which implicitly includes unchosen
alternatives), and how this misbehavior is then measured (by considering inequity aversion).
Likewise, most of the experimental literature testing reciprocating behaviors triggered by
kind intentions also considers that agent i measures player js intentions by comparing xi
and xj; see Cox (2001, 2003).
Similarly, Falk and Fischbacher (2006) recently analyze how a given player i evaluates
the kindness inferred from player js actions by also comparing their payo¤s. In particular,
that study measures kindness by considering the product of two elements: the above inter-
personal payo¤ comparison (what they refer as the outcome term), and a measure of other
playersintentions which reects the set of available choices for these players (the intentions
factor). Hence, Falk and Fischbacher (2006) assume that the reference standard with which
players compare their own payo¤ is that of other players, and then they scale up this payo¤
distribution according to the degree of freedom in the other playersavailable choices.
Finally, Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj (2007) construct a nonparametric model in which
a players preferences become more altruistic with respect to other players when she infers
that these players have behaved generously with her. However, their notion of generosity is
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not equivalent to our denition of kindness, nor does their notion of altruism coincide with
our denition of reciprocity, since they assume that players compare their payo¤s with that
of others in their group. Unlike these models, we do not introduce other peoples payo¤s
into player is evaluation of intentions or kindness. Instead, in our model player i measures
the kindness in player js actions by comparing player js chosen and unchosen (foregone)
actions. In the following section we describe how this comparison is made, and how it
encompasses models on inequity aversion and intentions-based reciprocity as special cases.
2.2 MODEL
Let us consider the following class of complete information sequential-move games with two
players and two stages. Specically, we focus on games in which: (1) playersactions work
as strategic substitutes; and where (2) every player benets from increases in other players
actions. In particular, let us consider games G = hSi; Sj;ui; uji, in which a female leader
(player j) selects an action sj 2 Sj  R+, and afterwards a male follower (player i) chooses
an action si 2 Si  R+. The leaders action may represent, for instance, her wage o¤er to a
worker, or her monetary contribution to a public good. Similarly, the followers action may
denote, respectively, his e¤ort level in a labor market game, or his monetary donation to a
charity in the sequential public good game. (Note that for simplicity we describe our model
for continuous action spaces. Nonetheless, all our assumptions can be extended to discrete
action spaces as well). Every action prole s = (si; sj) 2 Si  Sj is then mapped into the
set of possible outcomes by function out : Si  Sj ! X. Note that an outcome, out(s),
in the ultimatum bargaining game is a monetary amount, while in public good games is a
pair composed of an amount of private goods and the total contributions to the public good.
Finally, every player i assigns a utility value to every outcome through her utility function
ui : X ! R.
Note that the outcome function maps every action prole into a single outcome, i.e.,
there is a unique action prole leading to every terminal node of the game. Hence, for every
outcome out(s) 2 X we can identify the unique action prole s = (si; sj) which induces that
outcome. This allows utility function ui : X ! R to be represented over action proles in
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the form UNCi : SiSj ! R, i.e., UNCi (si; sj) 2 R. Specically, superscript NC denotes that
player i is not concernedabout player js unchosen alternatives, as opposed to superscript
C, which we use in the next section to refer to players who are concerned about each
othersunchosen actions. Finally, let us henceforth denote by single (double) subscripts in
the utility function its rst (and second) order derivatives.
Assumption A1. Positive but decreasing marginal benet from other playersactions,
sj. That is, UNCsj (si; sj)  0  UNCsjsj(si; sj) for all si and sj.
Thus, every player i benets from increases in other playersactions, but at a decreasing
rate. Note that we are deliberately vague about how UNCi (si; sj) increases (or decreases)
in her own action si. In this way, we can capture models where playersmarginal utility
from increasing her action is positive (e.g., contributions in public good games) as well as
negative (e.g., e¤ort in labor market games). Next, we assume that player is utility function
is strictly concave in his own actions, si.
Assumption A2. Concavity. UNCsisi (si; sj) < 0 for all si and sj.
Note that concavity did not hold in the motivating example discussed in the introduction
since playersaction space was discrete and binary. Nonetheless, we introduce this assump-
tion given that it guarantees the existence of a unique equilibrium when playersaction space
is continuous. In particular, uniqueness will facilitate the comparison of the equilibrium pre-
diction in this case when players are not concerned about unchosen alternatives, and in the
case when players are concerned.4
Assumption A3. Strategic Substitutability. Player js (rst mover) utility function
satises UNCsjsi (si; sj) < 0 for all si and sj.
4In the case of discrete and binary action spaces, as those in the motivating example of the ultimatum
bargaining game, concavity is not necessary. Instead, in order to facilitate the comparison of our results and
those of standard models, we only need the subgame perfect equilibrium to be unique, both when players
are concerned about foregone options and when they are not.
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Thus, the rst movers marginal benet from increasing her own action, sj, decreases
when the second mover raises her action, si. That is, the leader considers the followers
actions as strategic substitutes of her own. This assumption is sensible for a large class of
games, where players try to free-ride each othersactions, e.g., the rst movers incentives to
free-ride the second movers donations to the public good or his e¤ort decision. Therefore,
A3 eliminates payo¤ structures such as those in the impunity game, whereby (in a variation
of the ultimatum bargaining game) the rst mover obtains exactly the same payo¤ regardless
of the second movers actions, i.e., unconditional on his acceptance or rejection of the rst
movers o¤er. In contrast, A3 maintains the rst movers incentives to free-ride the second
movers action, since she considers playersactions as strategic substitutes.
2.2.1 How kindness enters into playerspreferences
As suggested in the motivating example from Brandts and Solà (2001), playersobserved
behavior is clearly inconsistent across the games in their example. The games they consider
are nevertheless relatively similar, since only the set of available choices for the proposer
is modied. In particular, we want to describe a single utility function which is general
enough to be applicable to games maintaining similarproperties, as the two treatments
considered by Brandts and Solà (2001). Specically, in this paper we regard games as being
similar when the utility that player i obtains from every action prole s coincides across the
games for which this action prole induces the same outcome out(s), and out(s) 2 X. (In
the previous example of the ultimatum bargaining game, if a given action prole induces the
same outcome across di¤erent games then the utility that players obtain from this action
prole coincide across these games.) In particular, let UCi (si; sj) represent the utility function
we apply to this class of games. Specically, UCi (si; sj) is player is utility function when
he uses player js foregone options as a measure of the kindness behind her actions. Let us
rst describe how this kindness enters into player is utility function, and then analyze how
players measure the kindness behind their opponents actions.
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Assumption A4. Kindness. For any actions si 2 Si and sj 2 Sj, player is utility
function satises
UCi (si; sj)  UNCi (si; sj) if kindness
UCi (si; sj) < U
NC
i (si; sj) if unkindness
Therefore, this assumption determines when that player i is concerned about social com-
parisons and interprets kindness from player js actions, his utility level is higher than when
he is not concerned about these comparisons. Otherwise (when he infers unkindness), his
utility level is lower. Let us next describe how this kindness a¤ects player is marginal utility.
Assumption A5. Reciprocity. For any actions si 2 Si and sj 2 Sj, player is utility
function satises
UCsi (si; sj)  UNCsi (si; sj) if kindness
UCsi (si; sj) < U
NC
si
(si; sj) if unkindness
Hence, A5 species that when player i interprets kindness from player js actions, his
marginal utility from increasing si when he is concerned about foregone options is weakly
higher that when he is not. Otherwise, his marginal utility is lower. This property is
illustrated in gure A1 (see appendix). In particular, this assumption leads player i to
increase his action when he infers kindness (positive reciprocity), and to decrease it when he
infers unkindness (negative reciprocity).
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2.2.2 How players measure kindness
Let us now describe how players evaluate the kindness behind other playersactions. In par-
ticular, we assume that player i measures kindness through the following distance function,
Di(si; sj), and that he infers kindness when the outcome of this distance function is positive,
and unkindness otherwise.
Di(si; sj) = i

sj   sRij (si; sj)

for any i 2 R, where i can be both positive or negative. Thus, player i evaluates player js
kindness by comparing player js actually chosen action, sj, and a particular reference action
that player i uses for comparison, sRij (si; sj) 2 Sj, among player js available choices, as we
dene below.5 For simplicity, this distance function was chosen to be linear. Nonetheless,
from a more general perspective, player is distance function could be nonlinear, as long as
it increases in player js actually chosen strategy, sj, and decreases in the reference action
that player i uses for comparison.
We consider that this reference-dependent measure is a natural way for player i to assess
player js actions, which is yet general enough to embed di¤erent behavioral models as special
cases. In particular, this distance function is similar to that in the literature on reference-
dependent preferences, such as Köszegi and Rabin (2006). However, their model analyzes
individual decision making, unlike this paper where we examine its strategic e¤ects. On the
other hand, our distance function di¤ers from that in Rabin (1993) for simultaneous-move
games and that in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) for sequential-move games. Indeed,
these studies assume that player i compares his actual payo¤with respect to the equitable
payo¤ (his equitable share in the Pareto-e¢ cient payo¤s). In contrast, we allow player i to
compare player js actually chosen action with respect to any feasible action, sRij (si; sj) 2 Sj,
leading to equitable or non-equitable payo¤s. Let us next dene the concept of reference
5Note that, for simplicity, we assume that player i compares player js actions, instead of the payo¤s
resulting from these action choices. Choosing the latter, however, would not modify our results, since player
is payo¤s are increasing in player js action choices (assumption A1). Hence, both a denition of kindness
based on the payo¤s that player i obtains from player js choices and a denition directly based on these
choices increase in player js action choices.
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action, sRij (si; sj), which player i uses as a reference point in order to evaluate the kindness
that he perceives from player js actually chosen action, sj.
Denition 1. Player is reference point function sRij : Si  Sj ! Sj, maps the pair
(si; sj) of both playersactually chosen actions, into a reference action s
Ri
j 2 Sj from player
js set of available choices. In addition, sRij (si; sj) is weakly increasing in si and sj, and
twice continuously di¤erentiable in si and sj.
Hence, player i can use any of player js available actions in Sj as a reference point.6
That is, sRij (si; sj) is allowed to be above/below/equal to player js actually chosen action, sj,
which leads to negative/positive/null distances, respectively. Obviously, the particular sign of
such distance a¤ects player is utility function, UCi (si; sj), as described above. Additionally,
note that when both playersstrategy spaces are identical, Si = Sj = S, player is reference
point function becomes sRij : S
2 ! S. In this context, the reference point function can be,
for instance, sRij (si; sj) = si for all sj. In such case, Di(si; sj) = i [sj   si], and player i
compares player js chosen action, sj, with respect to her own, si. In particular, note two
specic examples of this distance function. First, when i > 0, it may represent the case
that sj > si is interpreted by player i as a signal of player js kindness (e.g., her commitment
to contribute high donations to the public good), whereas sj < si is evaluated by player i as
a sign of unkindness by her opponent (e.g., free-riding). The second example is related to
playersconcerns for status acquisition. Particularly, when i < 0, player i makes the same
comparison, but introduces the outcome of Di(si; sj) into her utility function negatively,
i.e. Di(si; sj) =  i [sj   si] = i [si   sj] In these cases, player i may evaluate sj > si
negatively because the action space might represent the consumption of a given positional
good that enhances social status.
Furthermore, we allow player i to modify the reference action he uses to compare player
js actually chosen action, i.e., sRij (si; sj) is not restricted to be constant for all sj. In
6For simplicity, we restrict the range of reference points to player js available choices, Sj . More generally,
sRij (si; sj) could take values outside Sj . We believe, however, that it is more natural to assume that player i
compares player js actions with respect to her foregone options than to actions which were not even available
to her.
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particular, we only assume that, for a given increase in player js action, sj, the refer-
ence point that player i uses, sRij (si; sj), does not increase as fast as player js action,
i.e., 1  @sRij (si; sj) =@sj. Intuitively, this condition makes higher values of player js ac-
tion meaningful for player i, since they increase the outcome of his distance function, i.e.,
@Di(si; sj)=@sj = 1   @sRij (si; sj) =@sj; and as we described above, larger distances raise
player is utility level (kindness). As a remark, note that Di (si; sj) does not depend on any
possible randomness over payo¤s. Indeed, player is utility level does not depend on the
di¤erence between payo¤s he could have received from the outcomes of a certain lottery, but
only on payo¤s he could have obtained from alternative choices of the other players. This
distinction di¤erentiates our approach from regret theory, as in Loomes and Sugden (1982),
since our model focuses on agent is evaluation of other playerschosen and unchosen actions
as a measure of their kindness. Finally, extending assumption A2 to the context of concerned
players, we assume that UCi (si; sj) is also strictly concave in all player is actions, si.
2.2.3 Best response function
Let sCi (sj) 2 argmax
si
UCi (si; sj) denote player is best response function when he assigns a
positive importance to player js foregone options, and sNCi (sj) 2 argmax
si
UNCi (si; sj) his
best response function when he does not. Let us next analyze the slope of player is best
response function.
Lemma 1. The slope of player is best response function when he is concerned about
foregone options, sCi (sj), is higher than that when he is not, s
NC
i (sj). That is,
@sCi (sj)
@sj
 @s
NC
i (sj)
@sj
for any sj 2 Sj
That is, when player i assigns a positive importance to foregone options he is more
sensitive to increases in player js actions than when he does not. In addition to being
more sensitive, the next proposition shows that in fact he actually responds more (less)
cooperatively when he perceives kindness (unkindness) from player js actions compared to
how he would react in the case of being unconcerned about player js unchosen alternatives.
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Proposition 1. Player is best response function when he is concerned about foregone
options is higher than that when he is not if player i infers kindness from player js actions;
and lower if he infers unkindness. That is,
sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj) for all sj such that Di (si; sj)  0
sCi (sj) < s
NC
i (sj) for all sj such that Di (si; sj) < 0
Intuitively, player i (when concerned about player js foregone options) responds more
cooperatively to what he perceives as kind actions, Di (si; sj)  0, than when he is uncon-
cerned, i.e., sCi (sj) > s
NC
i (sj). The opposite happens when he interprets that player js
actions are unkind, i.e., sCi (sj) < s
NC
i (sj). In other words, his interpretation of kind (or un-
kind) actions triggers a higher (lower) response when he is concerned about foregone options
than when he is not. For example, the worker in the labor market gift exchange game, when
perceiving kind actions from the rm manager, exerts a higher e¤ort when he is concerned
about the rm managers unchosen alternatives (foregone wage o¤ers) than when he is not,
and a lower e¤ort otherwise.
2.3 EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
Recall that player j represents the rst mover in this complete information sequential-move
game, and player i denotes the second mover. Note that player is best response function,
sCi (sj), in the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game was already described in the above
lemma 1 and proposition 1. Let us now analyze player js (rst mover) equilibrium action
in this sequential game.
Lemma 2. The leaders marginal utility from increasing her own action sj is higher
when the follower is concerned about her unchosen alternatives than when he is not. That
is, for any action sj 2 Sj player js (rst mover) utility function satises,
@UNCj
 
sCi (sj) ; sj

@sj
 @U
NC
j
 
sNCi (sj) ; sj

@sj
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From this lemma, the following proposition is immediately derived.
Proposition 2. If assumptions A1-A5 are satised, then sCj  sNCj . That is, the leaders
equilibrium strategy when dealing with a follower who is concerned about foregone options,
sCj , is weakly higher than her equilibrium strategy when facing a follower not concerned about
foregone options, sNCj .
Hence, in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy prole of the game with positive
concerns for foregone options the leader chooses a higher equilibrium action than that in the
game with no concerns for unchosen alternatives.7 This result is especially relevant for certain
games, such as the labor market gift exchange and the sequential public good game, where
the introduction of concerns for foregone options leads to higher levels of cooperation among
the players. In particular, as we show in section 5 for di¤erent economic applications, the
fact that the follower is sensitive to the leaders unchosen alternatives attenuates the leaders
incentives to shift most of the burden to the follower (reducing free-riding) which ultimately
triggers higher actions from her than in standard game-theoretic models.8 Furthermore, the
prole of actions that players choose in equilibrium, as we also show in section 5, can better
rationalize experimental results of playersobserved behavior.
2.3.1 Remarks on inequity aversion and reciprocity
In this paper we analyze how the consideration of foregone options a¤ects playersequilibrium
strategies. Nonetheless, in this subsection, we show that (under certain conditions) our
model can also support the results of the literature on inequity aversion and intentions-
based reciprocity as special cases.
7As a remark, note that the follower moves his action choice in the opposite direction than the rst
mover moves her when he regards actions as strategic substitutes (negatively sloped best response function);
whereas he moves it in the same direction when actions are strategic complements (positively sloped best
response function).
8These results can be easily generalized to sequential-move games with N players. In such settings,
every player measures the kindness he infers from the actually chosen strategies of every player who played
before him. The outcome of each of these individual comparisons can then be added up (or scaled in a
weighted average), in order to evaluate player is distance function. Despite the greater generality of such
model, nonetheless, its results and intuition are already captured by the two-player setting we consider in
this paper.
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Proposition 3. Assume sRij (si; sj) = si for all sj. Then, player is preferences can be
represented as a weighted average of her material payo¤s and those of player j.
UCi (si; sj) = iU
NC
i (si; sj) + jU
NC
j (sj; si) where i; j 2 R
In particular, the above proposition uses Segal and Sobels (1999) results to specify that,
when player i compares player js actually chosen action, sj, with that chosen by herself,
si, her utility function UCi (si; sj) can be represented as an (additively separable) weighted
average of both playersmaterial payo¤s. Therefore, in such context our model captures
players concerns for inequity aversion (or altruism) as a special case. In addition, this
model also captures the literature on intentions-based reciprocity as a special case. Indeed,
the above utility representation embodies Charness and Rabins (2002) model for the case
that player i infers misbehavior from player js actions, and for i = 1    and j =  .
That is,
UCi (si; sj) = (1  )UNCi (si; sj)  UNCj (sj; si)
= UNCi (si; sj) + 

UNCi (si; sj)  UNCj (sj; si)

Therefore, when players use their own action si as a reference point to compare other
playersactually chosen action, sj, our model embeds both inequity aversion and intentions-
based reciprocity as special cases.9
9Clearly, this representation of player is utility function does not completely capture Charness and
Rabins (2002) model, since they analyze other facets of individualsbehavior, such as inequity aversion, in
addition to reciprocity. However, when restricted to intensions-based reciprocity alone, and when player i
infers misbehavior from player js actions, the above utility function coincides with that in Charness and
Rabin (2002).
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2.4 APPLICATIONS
2.4.1 Ultimatum bargaining game
Let us rst apply our model to the ultimatum bargaining game where a (female) proposer
j is called to choose how to divide a pie (of size normalized to one) between the (male)
responder i and herself, and the responder either accepts or rejects the division suggested
by the proposer, si 2 fA;Rg. In particular, let (sj; 1  sj) represent the actual division
o¤ered by player j, where sj denotes the share of the pie accruing to the responder (which
coincides with his payo¤, sj = xi), and let 1  sj be the remaining share of the pie that the
proposer keeps for herself (which coincides with the proposers payo¤, 1  sj = xj). Hence,
xi represents the o¤er that the proposer makes to the responder, and fi denotes the foregone
o¤er that the responder uses as a reference action, sRj . Specically, the responders utility
function we use is given by the following expression10, for any xi 2 [0; 1], and i  0,
UCi (si; sj) = sj + i
 
sj   sRj

= xi + i (xi   fi)
Clearly, if xi > fi, the responder perceives kindness from the proposer, and gets his
utility level increased in the second term. This additional utility is, furthermore, increasing
in i, the parameter reecting the importance that the responder assigns to the distance
xi   fi. Intuitively, perceiving kind actions has greater e¤ects on a receiver who is highly
concerned about foregone options than on a receiver with small concerns about them. In
addition, when either i = 0 or xi = fi, the receivers utility function just coincides with his
utility when he is not concerned about the proposers foregone options. In contrast, when
xi < fi the second term becomes negative. Now, the responder gets his utility level decreased
from the unkindness he perceives from the proposers actual o¤er, since xi < fi. Next, we
check that the responders utility function satises all the assumptions we consider in the
previous section.
10Di¤erent functional forms for UCi (si; sj) satisfy assumptions A1 through A5, leading to the results
predicted in the previous section. Nonetheless, a simple expression is used here to emphasize intuition.
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Lemma 3 UCi (si; sj) satises A1 through A5.
We now introduce an example, in order to illustrate the main intuition behind the above
utility function. In particular, we focus on the comparison between those utility functions
analyzed in the literature and that suggested above, by using the Brandts and Solà (2001)
experimental results.
Example 1
Let us take an ultimatum bargaining game where the proposer chooses among two alternative
divisions of the pie: (xi; xj) = (0:2; 0:8) versus (fi; fj) = (0:125; 0:875), where the aforementioned
experimental results observe an overall accepting behavior from the receiver, or (xi; xj) = (0:2; 0:8)
versus (fi; fj) = (0:875; 0:125), where the above experiments found several rejections. We rst
show that this pattern of rejections cannot be explained by Fehr and Schmidts (1999) model
on social preferences. When the receiver experiences inequity aversion, and the proposer o¤ers
(xi; xj) = (0:2; 0:8) instead of (fi; fj) = (0:125; 0:875), the receiver accepts if
xi imax fxj   xi; 0g imax fxi   xj; 0g=
0:2  imax f0:8  0:2; 0g= 0:2  0:6i> 0, if and only if i<1
3
While, in the case of receiving an o¤er (xi; xj) = (0:2; 0:8) instead of (fi; fj) = (0:875; 0:125)
the receiver rejects if
0:2  imax f0:8  0:2; 0g= 0:2  0:6i< 0, if and only if i>1
3
which is not possible. Hence, this pattern of rejections cannot be explained by inequity aversion.
Let us now apply these payo¤s to the utility function of the receiver with positive concerns
about foregone options. In the case of receiving o¤er (xi; xj) = (0:2; 0:8) instead of (fi; fj) =
(0:125; 0:875) the receiver accepts such o¤er if 0:2 + i(0:2   0:125)= 0:2 0:075i> 0, i.e.,
i>  8=3, which is satised since i  0. Similarly, applying it to the case in which the pro-
poser o¤ers (xi; xj) = (0:2; 0:8) and foregoes (fi; fj) = (0:875; 0:125), the receiver rejects it if
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0:2 + i(0:2  0:875)= 0:2 0:675i< 0, i.e., i> 0:29. Thus, this o¤er is rejected if and only if
the receivers concern about foregone options is su¢ ciently high, i > 0:29.
Hence, the above utility function is then able to explain why a responder who has no
concerns about social payo¤s (i.e., an individualisticresponder) accepts an o¤er when it
is associated to kindness from the proposer, xi > fi, but can reject this same o¤er when
he evaluates it as a signal of unkindness. From the above utility function, we obtain the
following result, describing the responder acceptance rule in this example.
Lemma 4. In the ultimatum bargaining game with a responder who assigns a weight
i  0 to the proposers foregone divisions of the pie, fi, the responder accepts any o¤er xi
if and only if xi > xi, where xi = i1+ifi.
Let us emphasize some interesting insights from the above lemma, illustrated in gure
3 below. Clearly, when i = 0 the responders acceptance rule collapses to xi = 0. Indeed,
when the responder does not assign any weight to the proposers unchosen actions, then
any positive division of the pie is accepted by the responder, as in standard ultimatum
bargaining games. Furthermore, the responders acceptance threshold xi is increasing in i,
the importance he associates to the proposers unchosen alternatives, i.e., he becomes more
demanding in i. Finally, xi is increasing in fi, the receivers foregone option (represented
by an upward shift in the gure). Thus, the more demanding the receiver becomes (higher
fi) the more the proposer must o¤er him to induce his acceptance. Importantly, note that
the minimum division that the receiver accepts, xi, is smaller than one (the total size of the
pie) for any parameter values. Hence, xi leaves some strictly positive portion of the pie to
the proposer even when the receiver is extremely demanding (high i and fi).
Intuitively, the above acceptance rule of the responder shows that now the responder is
not going to accept any positive o¤er, as the standard ultimatum bargaining game predicts
when no concerns about the proposers foregone options are considered. This fact clearly
a¤ects the proposers optimal strategies. Certainly, if the proposer wants to obtain any
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Figure 3: Cuto¤ xi, for fi= 0:5 and fi= 0:8.
positive payo¤ from the game, she must make an o¤er which is accepted by the responder,
as we show below.
Proposition 4. In the ultimatum bargaining game where the responder assigns an
importance of i  0 to the options that the proposer forwent, the following strategy prole
describes the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential game.
Responder accepts any o¤er xi such that xi > xi, where xi = i1+ifi.
Proposer o¤ers xi =
i
1+i
fi, for any parameter values.
Unlike models where the receiver is not concerned about foregone options  where the
proposer keeps the entire pie for himself the distribution of equilibrium payo¤s when the
receiver assigns a positive importance to foregone options is less unequal, as the following
corollary species.
Corollary 1. The distribution of equilibrium payo¤s in the ultimatum bargaining game
where the responder assigns importance i to the proposers foregone option, fi, is
(xi; xj) =

i
1 + i
fi; 1  i
1 + i
fi

Indeed, note that this distribution of payo¤s is more egalitarian than that of models where
the receiver is not concerned about foregone options, (xi; xj) = (0; 1), for any parameter
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values. Hence, by considering the proposers foregone options into the responders utility
function we obtain higher degrees of fairness in the equilibrium payo¤s, as well as higher
cooperation between the players.
Let us nally relate our theoretical results with those of the experimental literature.
In particular, Falk et al. (2003) and Brandts and Solà (2001) show the existence of a
relationship between the receivers acceptance threshold and the particular foregone o¤er
that the proposer did not make. Indeed, both of these studies show that, conditional on
o¤er (xi; xj) = (0:2; 0:8) being made, the acceptance rate increases in the distance between
the proposers chosen and unchosen alternatives, as the following gures illustrate.
In particular, note that the rst column of gure 4, where xi   fi = 0:2   0:5 =  0:3,
represents a negative distance between the proposers actual and foregone o¤er, from which
the receiver infers unkindness.On the other hand, column 3, where xi  fi = 0:2  0 = 0:2
(and the distance is positive) denotes the case in which the receiver interprets kindness
from the proposers o¤er, since she could have o¤ered him less than she actually did. Finally,
column 2 illustrates the case in which the proposer has no degree of freedom in choosing
her particular o¤er to the receiver. i.e., the proposers o¤er is (0.2,0.8) and her alternative
is also (0.2,0.8). In this case, the outcome of the distance function is zero, what leads the
receiver to neither perceive kindnessnor unkindnessfrom the proposers actions.11
Interestingly, the fact that the acceptance rate in the second column is exactly higher
than when he perceives unkindness(column 1) but lower than when he infers kindness
(column 3) supports our results.12 A similar intuition is also applicable to Brandts and Solàs
(2001) results as gure 5 suggests. Hence, both of these studies conrm our theoretical
prediction about the proposers o¤er. Indeed, proposers are observed to make low o¤ers
when kindness can be inferred from such o¤ers (positive distances), and high o¤ers when
they are interpreted in terms of unkindness (negative distances).
11According to Falk et al. (2003), the small (but positive) percentage of rejections in this case can be
supported by players inequity aversion, since they might dislike the unequal payo¤ distribution resulting
from their acceptance of (0.2,0.8). The fact that the responder does not attribute any responsibility to the
proposer in settings where the latter does not have any choice to make has been extensively studied by
psychologists with the use of attribution theory; see Ross and Fletcher (1985).
12Despite the regularity of their results (acceptance rates which increase in the outcome of the distance
function), both of these studies report relatively high acceptance rates when distances are highly negative.
Nonetheless, such acceptance rates are still lower than in the case of positive distances.
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Figure 4: Falk et al. (2003)
2.4.2 Labor market gift exchange game
We now apply the above model to a labor market gift exchange game, where the proposer is
identied as a rm making a wage o¤er to a worker, who decides what level of e¤ort to exert.
In traditional models without considerations about unchosen options, since e¤ort is costly
and the worker is the last player to move, the workers equilibrium strategy (in the subgame
where the worker is called to move) is to exert zero e¤ort regardless of the actual wage o¤er
made by the rm. Operating by backwards induction, the subgame perfect equilibrium of
this game predicts that the rm o¤ers the lowest possible wage and that workers exert zero
e¤ort for any wage o¤ered. These models have found however limited experimental evidence.
Indeed, Fehr and Gachter (2000) summarize a series of experiments on labor markets where
they conrm the existence of a positive correlation between the wage o¤ered by the rm and
the e¤ort exerted by the worker.
We next suggest a utility function that satises the properties considered in section 3
and that can rationalize the above experimental results. As in previous sections, we assume
that the rm chooses a wage o¤er xi 2 [0; 1] to the worker. Similarly, let fi 2 [0; 1] represent
the foregone wage o¤er that the worker uses as a comparison against the actual wage o¤er
xi. In particular, let us consider the following utility function for the worker.
UCi (si; sj) = xi   e2 + i(xi   fi)e
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Figure 5: Brandts and Sola (2001)
The above utility function coincides with the standard utility function of a worker who
exerts costly e¤ort when the parameter denoting the importance of foregone options, i,
approaches zero. The third term represents the relevance of the foregone options for the
worker, i.e., the wage o¤ers that the rm did not make when proposing the actual o¤er
xi. Note that when the foregone wage proposal is higher than the actual wage o¤ered,
xi < fi, then this third term becomes negative, and the worker experiences a disutility from
each unit of additional e¤ort exerted. Similarly, when xi > fi, this third term becomes
positive, and the worker interprets that the intentions of the rm are cooperative. That is,
the worker observes that the rm o¤ered a wage level which is above its foregone option,
which in turn increases the workers utility since he feels treated generously. In particular,
this utility function for the worker satises all the assumptions we considered in section 3,
as the following lemma species.
Lemma 5. UCi (si; sj) satises A1 through A5.
Intuitively, we should expect that, for proposals with a foregone option below the actual
o¤er, the worker should feel pleased by the kindness of the rm, and responds by exerting
a positive level of e¤ort, in contrast to the standard game-theoretic model. These intuitions
are conrmed in the following lemma.
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Lemma 6. In the gift exchange game where the worker assigns a value i to the distance
between the rms actual wage o¤er and its forgone alternative, the workers optimal e¤ort
level (in the subgame induced after the wage proposal) is given by
e (xi) = max

1
2
i (xi   fi) ; 0

This optimal e¤ort level is then positive if and only if the wage o¤er xi is above the
comparative foregone option, xi > fi, for any positive weight to foregone options, i. In
addition, an increase in the relative importance that the worker assigns to foregone options
increases his optimal e¤ort level, i.e., e (xi) weakly increases in i. On the other hand, for
a given weight on foregone options, i, and for a given wage o¤er xi, optimal e¤ort e (xi)
increases as the comparative foregone option fi decreases. Indeed, if the worker compares
the actual wage he receives, xi, with respect to the worst wage o¤er that the rm manager
could ever pay him (e.g., the legal minimum wage), he is easily pleased by many positive
wage o¤ers. On the contrary, a worker who compares his relative position with respect to
the best wage o¤er that the rm could a¤ord to pay him certainly evaluates most of the
wage o¤ers he receives as a signal of unkindness from the rm manager.
This optimal e¤ort level is illustrated in gures 6 and 7, which include in addition, the
workers e¤ort level eNC (xi) in the case of assigning no importance to foregone options. Note
that eNC (xi) is at at zero for all xi, since the worker exerts no e¤ort for all wage o¤ers. In
both gures, the worker concerned about foregone options exerts positive e¤orts as long as
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xi > fi for any positive weight on foregone options.13 On the one hand, gure 6 indicates
how the worker e¤ort pivots upward  with center at xi = fi when his concerns i about
the rmsunchosen alternatives increase. On the other hand, gure 7 represents how the
worker e¤ort shifts upwards when the rms unchosen alternative decreases (leftward shift
in the horizontal intercept).
Interestingly, these results are not only supported by the aforementioned experimental
evidence, but also by recent empirical work. In particular, Mas (2006) shows that police
arrest rates and average sentence length decline (and crime reports raise) when the wage
increase that police unions obtain is lower than their wage demands, relative to when it is
higher. Hence, police union wage demands would work as the reference point which they use
in their negotiations for higher salaries with government o¢ cials.
Given the above optimal e¤ort function, and operating by backwards induction, we can
nd the rms optimal wage o¤er. Specically, we assume the following (standard) utility
function for the rm, V (sj; si) = (v   xi) e, where v represents the constant productivity of
e¤ort (e.g., how workers e¤ort is transformed into nal output); and xi denotes, as above,
the actual wage o¤er made to the worker. Moreover, v > 1, since the productivity of e¤ort is
assumed to be higher than any of the wage o¤ers, xi 2 [0; 1]. Inserting the workers optimal
e¤ort function found above, and manipulating, we nd the optimal o¤er made by the rm.
13Note that our results in the labor market gift exchange game are similar to those in Akerlof (1982) since
higher salaries induce higher e¤ort levels. In particular, Akerlofs (1982) results are a special case of ours.
when the foregone wage o¤er is exactly xed at the fair wagelevel.
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Proposition 5. In the gift exchange game where the worker assigns an importance of i
to the distance between the wage o¤er foregone by the rm and its actual o¤er, the subgame
perfect equilibrium strategies are the following
Firm o¤ers
xi =
v + fi(x

i )
2
Worker accepts any o¤er xi such that xi > 0. In addition, the worker exerts an e¤ort
level of
e (xi) = max

1
2
i (xi   fi(xi)) ; 0

As the above proposition species, the rms optimal o¤er xi is higher than the workers
foregone option, fi(xi ), since v > 1. In addition, x

i is increasing in the foregone option,
fi(x

i ), that the receiver uses to make the comparison with respect
14 to xi . In the standard
models where concerns for foregone options are not considered, the subgame perfect equilib-
rium of the game predicts that the worker exerts no positive e¤ort for any wage o¤er, and
the rm, anticipating the workers move, o¤ers the lowest possible wage. In contrast, in the
above environment including the importance of the foregone wage o¤ers for the worker, we
found that the rm makes a positive wage o¤er, since this o¤er can induce a higher level of
exerted e¤ort from the worker. That is, by showing kindness in high wage o¤ers, the rm
pleases the worker enough to induce him to exert higher e¤orts.
Clearly, the above equilibrium predictions are closer to the actual experimental results
observed in the literature, Fehr and Gachter (2000), which nd a positive correlation between
the wage o¤ered by the rm and the exerted e¤ort levels from the worker. Many authors have
rationalized the above ndings by using the e¢ ciency wage theory arguments. That is, if a
worker is paid above the minimum wage, he has a greater opportunity cost of shirking, which
induces him to work harder, and to exert e¤ort levels that are increasing in his wage o¤er.
This paper may thus complement this rationalization of the experimental results through
e¢ ciency wage theory. Nonetheless, the model we presented above can explain cooperative
14Note that, for simplicity, we assume that the worker compares all wage o¤ers with respect to the same
foregone option, i.e., f 0(xi ) = 0. Similar results are nonetheless applicable for the more general case in which
f 0(xi ) 6= 0, and they are included in the proof of proposition 5 at the appendix.
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behavior between employers and workers in the labor market without relying on the workers
opportunity cost of shirking, or his outside options if he is red.
Finally, these results also provide an interesting explanation for the existence of wage
di¤erentials across industries. Indeed, as Krueger and Summers (1988) show, industry wage
di¤erentials are signicant even after controlling for individual characteristics and rm qual-
ity; which suggests that these di¤erentials are not just due to unobserved di¤erences in
labor quality. Our model then rationalizes this result by predicting that rmsequilibrium
wage o¤er, after controlling for workers productivity, may vary depending on the particular
reference point that each worker uses for comparison.
2.4.3 Sequential public good game
The third game where we introduce the importance of the proposers foregone options is
the sequential public good game (PGG thereafter). Specically, we consider a sequential
solicitation game where a rst mover is asked to submit a donation, sj 2 [0; 1], for the
provision of a public good, and observing her donation, a follower decides the contribution,
si 2 [0; 1], he makes. In order to be consistent with the games dened above, the leader is
assumed to not assign any weight to the followers unchosen actions. In contrast, the follower
assigns a relevance i to a specic contribution that the leader did not select, and that the
follower uses as a reference point for comparison (reference action, sRj ). In particular, leader
and followers utility functions are, respectively
UNCj (sj; si) = zj + [m (si + sj)]
0:5
UCi (si; sj) = zi +

m (si + sj)

1 + i
 
sj   sRj
0:5
Both of these functions are quasilinear in the private good, z, and their nonlinear part
takes into account the utility derived from the total public good provisionG = si+sj (relevant
for both players) and the distance i
 
sj   sRj

, which is only relevant for the follower. For
simplicity, let us assume in this application that the follower uses the same reference action
sRj for all action choices of the leader. Finally, m  0 denotes the return every player obtains
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from total contributions to the public good. Interestingly, note how foregone options are
introduced into the followers utility function. When the relevance he assigns to the leaders
unchosen alternatives approaches zero, i = 0, the follower only cares about the private
and public good consumption. However, when he assigns a positive importance to foregone
options, he experiences a higher utility from contributing to the public good when the leaders
contribution is higher than the foregone option, sj > sRj , or a lower utility otherwise, sj < s
R
j .
In addition, this utility function satises all the assumptions we consider in section 3, as the
following lemma states.
Lemma 7. UCi (si; sj) satises A1 through A5.
Since we are discussing a sequential game where the follower decides how much to give
out of a continuous strategy choice, the second mover best response function is easily found
by solving the followers utility maximization problem. We summarize this result in the
following lemma.
Lemma 8. In the sequential PGG, where the follower assigns weight i to the distance
between the leaders actual contribution, sj, and the foregone contribution, sRj , the followers
best response function sCi (sj) is given by
sCi (sj) =
8><>:
m(1 isRj )
4
   1 + im
4

sj if sj 2

0;
m(1 isRj )
4 im

0 if sj  m(1 is
R
j )
4 im
Figure 8 compares the second movers best response function when he is concerned about
foregone options, sCi (sj), and when he is not, s
NC
i (sj):
Specically, note that the introduction of the importance of foregone options into the sec-
ond movers utility function makes sCi (sj) to pivot counterclockwise with respect to s
NC
i (sj),
with center at sj = sRj , making s
C
i (sj) steeper than s
NC
i (sj). Hence, the second mover rel-
atively reciprocates the rst movers contributions, since he reduces his donation when
sj < s
R
j , but increases it when sj > s
R
j . After nding s
C
i (sj), and by sequential rationality,
we can now nd the rst movers equilibrium contribution in this game.
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Lemma 9. In the sequential PGG, where the follower assigns a weight i to the leaders
foregone options, the leaders donation in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game
is
sj =
8<: 0 if i < i16(isRj  1)+2im2
16i
otherwise
where i = 1616sRj +m
Thus, the rst donor submits a zero contribution when the second donors concerns
for foregone options are low enough, i < i. Clearly, when i = 0 the rst donor also
submits a null donation, which coincides with the equilibrium prediction in standard PGGs.
However, when the second donors concerns for foregone options increase enough, i > i,
the rst mover is induced to submit positive contributions that can trigger further donations
from the second mover (given his reciprocating behavior described in the previous gure).
Additionally, note that as expected, the leaders contribution is increasing in the followers
concerns for foregone options, i, and in the foregone contribution that he uses as a reference
point for comparison, sRj .
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Proposition 6. In the sequential PGG where the second mover assigns a weight i to
the rst movers unchosen alternatives, the following strategy prole describes the subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game.
Proposer contributes
sj =
8<: 0 if i < i16(isRj  1)+2im2
16i
otherwise
And the second mover responds by contributing
sCi (sj) =
8><>:
m(1 isRj )
4
   1 + im
4

sj if sj 2

0;
m(1 isRj )
4 im

0 if sj  m(1 is
R
j )
4 im
Particularly, the above results specify that by having a second mover concerned about the
rst movers foregone options, the latter is induced to contribute (weakly) higher amounts
than those she would donate in the case of facing a responder with no concerns about her
unchosen alternatives. From a more general perspective, by introducing a follower con-
cerned about the leaders foregone options, we are able to obtain (weakly) higher levels of
cooperation in the public good provision.
2.5 CONCLUSIONS
Di¤erent experimental papers, such as Brandts and Solà (2001), Falk et al. (2003), and
Andreoni et al. (2002), accumulate a signicant evidence about the importance of a players
unchosen alternatives on other playersactions. Foregone options, in particular, may work as
standards against which every individual evaluates the kindness of other players in the popu-
lation. Importantly, these studies suggest that arguments on social preferences alone cannot
explain their experimental results without complementing their approach by considering the
importance of a playersunchosen alternatives inside his opponentsutility function.
This paper examines a tractable theoretical model that introduces these unchosen alter-
natives into individualspreferences via a reference point. We rst analyze the equilibrium
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prediction in complete information sequential-move games, and then compare it with that
of standard games where players are not concerned about unchosen alternatives. We show
that, without relying on interpersonal payo¤ comparisons (i.e., within strictly individual-
istic preferences), our model predicts higher levels of fairness in the resulting allocation,
as well as higher cooperation among the players, than standard game-theoretic models. In
addition, we demonstrate that this approach embeds as special cases many existing behav-
ioral models: from inequity aversion to intentions-based reciprocity. Therefore, this model
o¤ers a broader and more unifying explanation of agentsconduct than these models alone.
Furthermore, when applying our model to di¤erent sequential games, we obtain interesting
results. First, the equilibrium allocation in the ultimatum bargaining game is fairer than
that resulting from standard game-theoretic predictions. Second, workers e¤ort and rms
proposed wages are higher than in the usual labor market gift exchange model. Finally,
equilibrium donations in the sequential public good game are higher than the predictions for
standard models.
There are several natural extensions to the model introduced in this paper. First, it
would be interesting to experimentally test under which payo¤ structures we can rationalize
observed behavior using individualspreferences over equitable payo¤s, and in which envi-
ronments human conduct is instead mainly explained by the playersstrictly individualistic
preferencessuggested in this paper. One direct test of the dominance of these two behav-
ioral motives is, for example, the following ultimatum bargaining game. The proposer is
allowed to make only two divisions of the pie, of size normalized to one. In the rst treat-
ment she can o¤er (0.4, 0.6), giving 0.4 to the responder and keeping 0.6 for herself, or the
equitable payo¤ (0.5, 0.5). In the second treatment, the rst division of the pie is xed in
(0.4, 0.6), but the second division is now (0.6, 0.4) instead. Note that, conditional on the rst
o¤er, (0.4, 0.6), being made, the distance between the actual o¤er, 0.4, and the alternative
o¤er is higher in the rst treatment, 0:4  0:5 =  0:1, than in the second, 0:4  0:6 =  0:2.
Hence, according to our equilibrium predictions, we should observe more rejections in the
second treatment than in the rst. However, if we observe higher percentage of rejections
in the rst than in the second treatment, it must be that responders in the rst treatment
evaluate the equitable payo¤s that the proposer did not select as a more desirable goal than
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the higher individual payo¤ he could have received in the second treatment.
Second, in this paper the space of available alternatives was exogenously determined
before the beginning of the game. However, it would be interesting to allow players to
strategically select their available choices before the game starts, given that the kindness
other players perceive from their chosen actions depends on which available strategies are
not chosen. That is, by strategically selecting her set of available alternatives, a player may
induce other players to infer a greater kindness from her actions. This strategic selection of
available choices is observed in di¤erent contexts, where a player uses one of her unchosen
alternatives as an excuse to support her actual choices, since the equilibrium payo¤associated
with that particular unchosen action would have been certainly worse than that from her
chosen action. These extensions can certainly enhance our understanding of the role of
playersforegone options on their opponentsincentives, and how such incentives can lead
to higher degrees of cooperation from a strictly individualistic perspective.
36
3.0 SOCIAL COMPARISONS AS A DEVICE FOR COOPERATION IN
SIMULTANEOUS-MOVE GAMES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
During the last decade several elements have been separately suggested to explain agentsbe-
havior in experimental settings: from individualsinequity aversion, as in Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), to agentspreference for social status, as in Hopkins
and Kornienko (2004) and Du¤y and Kornienko (2005). Despite their ability to rationalize
human conduct in specic economic environments, there is a substantial controversy about
what particular facet most generally drives individualsbehavior in unrestricted environ-
ments. Or in other words, about the possibility to identify a common element connecting
most of these experimental observations.
In this paper, I examine a model describing individual behavior that embeds many of
these approaches as special cases of a broader explanation of human conduct in strategic
settings. Specically, this model is based on the common observation that peoples choices
are usually a¤ected by the kindnessthey infer from the actions of the individuals they in-
teract with, such as their neighbors, friends and relatives. Of course, the particular measure
of kindnessthat each of us uses to evaluate other individualsactions might be di¤erent.
For instance, some people compare other agentschoices with respect to their own. Other
individuals may instead evaluate other agentsactions with respect to some specic action
they deem as kind.Indeed many other examples abound; yet, they share a common pat-
tern: in all of them individuals evaluate other agentschoices with respect to a particular
reference action, which they use as a reference point for comparison.
Using this general denition of kindness, this paper examines the e¤ects of social com-
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parisons on strategic interaction. In particular, this study identies under what conditions
one can predict that individuals playing simultaneous-move games become more cooperative
when they assign a positive importance to kindness, relative to when they do not. Particu-
larly, this result holds under certain conditions on the reference point they use for comparison
 which determines when a particular action by other agent is considered to be relatively
kind or unkind and on whether these considerations about kindness lead players to regard
each othersactions as more strategically substitutable or complementary.
Specically, I show that when players consider other playerschoices as relatively kind
and playersactions become more strategically complementary, both players increase their
equilibrium strategies beyond the equilibrium level in standard models. Similarly, this result
is also applicable to the case in which players consider other agentsstrategies as relatively
unkind but actions become more strategically substitutable. Finally, I demonstrate that
these results are not only valid for games where playersactions are regarded as strategic
complements, but also for those in which these actions are strategic substitutes. Hence,
this paper identies under what conditions playersrelative comparisons (evaluating other
playerskindness) act as a device for cooperation that triggers higher strategy choices by
both players.
Therefore, this papers main contributions can be divided into two. First, from a general
perspective, this paper shows that, under certain conditions, agentsconsideration of relative
comparisons may lead them to become more cooperative than in standard models. Impor-
tantly, this result applies even when players are not concerned about other playersmaterial
payo¤s. Indeed, unlike models with inequity averse individuals where players do care about
other individualspayo¤s (social preferences), this paper analyzes conditions under which
agents cooperate more than in standard models without the need to assume that they care
about other playerspayo¤s, i.e., even when agentspreferences can be regarded as strictly
individualistic.Second, I show that the model this paper describes embeds as special cases
existing behavioral models: from models on intentions-based reciprocity to those analyzing
social status acquisition.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I introduce the measure of kindness
that players use and as how it enters into individualspreferences. Sections three and four
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analyze playersequilibrium strategies when either both or only one of the parties assigns
a positive weight to kindness in these simultaneous-move games. Then, in section ve, I
apply this model to di¤erent examples of public good games in which donors simultaneously
contribute to a charity. Section six summarizes the main contributions of the paper.
3.2 MODEL
Let us consider complete information simultaneous-move games in which every player i
chooses an action from her strategy space Si 2

si; si
  R+. This strategy may rep-
resent, for example, player is voluntary contribution to a public good, or in the context
of oligopoly games, its production decision in a Cournot model. In particular, let us use
UNCi  UNCi (si; sj) to refer to player is utility function when she is not concerned about
relative comparisons. Since this utility function does coincide with those in the standard
game-theoretic models, I alternatively refer to UNCi as player is material payo¤ , where the
superscript NC denotes the fact that player i is not concernedabout relative comparisons.
On the other hand, let UCi (si; sj) be player is utility function when she is concerned
about relative comparisons. In the following subsection, I describe how players make their
comparisons, and in subsection 3.2 how every player introduces the result of this comparison
into her utility function.
3.2.1 How players measure kindness
Let us now describe how players evaluate the kindness behind other playersactions. In par-
ticular, we assume that player i measures kindness through the following distance function,
Di(si; sj), and that he infers kindness when the outcome of this distance function is positive,
and unkindness otherwise (see assumption 1 below).
Di(si; sj) = i

sj   sRij (si; sj)

for any i 2 R. Thus, player i evaluates player js kindness by comparing the di¤erence
between the action that player js chooses in equilibrium, sj, and a particular reference
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action that player i uses for comparison, sRij (si; sj) 2 Sj, among player js available choices,
as dened below.1 I believe that this reference-dependent measure is a natural way for player
i to assess player js actions, which is yet general enough to embed di¤erent behavioral models
as special cases. In particular, this distance function is similar to that in the literature on
reference-dependent preferences, such as Köszegi and Rabin (2006). However, their model
analyzes individual decision making, unlike this paper where we examine strategic e¤ects.
On the other hand, the distance function suggested in this paper di¤ers from that in Rabin
(1993) for simultaneous-move games and that in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) for
sequential-move games. Indeed, these studies assume that player i compares his actual payo¤
with respect to the equitablepayo¤ (his equitable share in the Pareto-e¢ cient payo¤s).
In contrast, I allow player i to compare the action that player js chooses in equilibrium
with respect to any feasible action, sRij (si; sj) 2 Sj, leading to equitable or non-equitable
payo¤s. Let us next dene the concept of reference action, sRij (si; sj), which player i uses as
a reference point in order to evaluate the kindness that he perceives from player js chosen
action, sj.
Denition 1. Player is reference point function sRij : Si  Sj ! Sj, maps the pair
(si; sj) of both playerschosen actions, into a reference action s
Ri
j 2 Sj from player js set
of available choices. In addition, sRij (si; sj) is weakly increasing in si and sj, and twice
continuously di¤erentiable in si and sj.
Hence, player i can use any of player js available actions in Sj as a reference point.2
That is, sRij (si; sj) is allowed to be above/below/equal to player js chosen action, sj, which
leads to negative/positive/null distances, respectively. Obviously, the particular sign of such
1For simplicity, this distance function was chosen to be linear. Nonetheless, from a more general per-
spective, player is distance function could be nonlinear, as long as it increases in player js actually chosen
strategy, sj , and decreases in the reference action that player i uses for comparison. Note that in such setting,
Bolton and Ockenfels(2000) model (whereby agentsutility increases in their share of total income) could
be embedded as a special case. For the sake of clarity, however, I henceforth use the above linear distance
function.
2For simplicity, I restrict the range of reference points to player js available choices, Sj . More generally,
sRij (si; sj) could take values outside Sj . I believe, however, that it is more natural to assume that player i
compares player js actions with respect to her foregone options than to actions which were not even available
to her.
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distance a¤ects player is utility function, UCi (si; sj), as we describe below. Additionally,
note that when both playersaction spaces are identical, Si = Sj = S, player is reference
point function becomes sRij : S
2 ! S. In this context, the reference point function can
be, for instance, sRij (si; sj) = si for all sj. In such case, the distance function becomes
Di(si; sj) = i [sj   si], and player i compares the action that player j chooses in equilibrium,
sj, with respect to her own action, si.
In particular, note two specic examples of this distance function. First, when i > 0,
it may represent the case in which playersequilibrium actions satisfy sj > si, and player i
interprets kindness from player js choices (e.g., her commitment to contribute high donations
to the public good), whereas sj < si is evaluated by player i as a sign of unkindness by her
opponent (e.g., free-riding). The second example is related to playersconcerns for status
acquisition. Particularly, when i < 0, player i makes the same comparison, but introduces
the outcome of Di(si; sj) into her utility function negatively, i.e. Di(si; sj) =  i [sj   si] =
i [si   sj] In these cases, player i may evaluate sj > si negatively because the action space
might represent the consumption of a given positional good that enhances social status.
Furthermore, we allow player i to modify the reference action he uses to compare player
js chosen action, i.e., sRij (si; sj) is not restricted to be constant for all sj. In particular, we
assume that, for a given increase in player js action, sj, the reference point that player i uses,
sRij (si; sj), does not increase as fast as player js action, i.e., 1  @sRij (si; sj) =@sj. Intuitively,
this condition makes higher values of player js action meaningful for player i, since they
increase the outcome of his distance function, i.e., @Di(si; sj)=@sj = 1   @sRij (si; sj) =@sj.
And as we describe below, positive distances ultimately raise player is utility level.
3.2.2 How kindness enters into playerspreferences
After examining how players evaluate other playersactions through the construction of a
distance Di, let us next analyze how this distance enters into playersutility function. First,
I consider how a player prefers, for a given pair of chosen actions si and sj, those pairs (si; sj)
associated to positive rather than negative distances.
41
Assumption 1. Kindness. For any actions si 2 Si and sj 2 Sj, player is utility function
satises
UCi (si; sj)  UNCi (si; sj) for all Di (si; sj)  0
UCi (si; sj) < U
NC
i (si; sj) for all Di (si; sj) < 0
Therefore, this assumption determines that player i interprets kindness from player js
chosen actions when the outcome of her distance function is positive, and infers unkindness
otherwise. That is, when player i is concerned about social comparisons and she interprets
kindness from player js actions, Di (si; sj)  0, her utility level is higher than when she is
not concerned about these comparisons; and it is lower when she infers unkindness. Let us
nally dene when a players relative comparisons are considered as relatively demanding
with respect to other playersactions, and when they can be regarded as not-demanding.
Denition 2. Player is relative comparisons are dened as demanding if and only
if she infers unkindness (negative distance) from player js equilibrium action when players
are not concerned about social comparisons, sNCj . That is, D
NC
i  i

sNCj   sRj

< 0.
Otherwise, player is relative comparisons are denoted as not-demanding.
Intuitively, player i would be regarded as demanding,DNCi < 0, if the reference level
she uses to compare player js actions is above sNCj , i.e., she sets a high standard to as-
sess player js actions (demanding). On the contrary, player i would be regarded as not-
demanding,DNCi > 0, if the reference level she uses to compare player js actions is below
sNCj , setting a low standard to evaluate player js choices.
3.3 BEST RESPONSE FUNCTION
The previous section described the structure behind playerspreferences, how they use the
distance function to evaluate other playersactions, and how this distance enters into players
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utility function. In this section, I characterize playersbest response function in this class of
simultaneous-move games.
Let sCi (sj) 2 argmax
si
UCi (si; sj) denote player is best response function when she assigns
a positive importance to relative comparisons, and let sNCi (sj) 2 argmax
si
UNCi (si; sj) repre-
sent her best response function when she does not assign any weight to such comparisons.
For simplicity, both UNCi (si; sj) and U
C
i (si; sj) are assumed to be strictly concave in every
player is own strategy, si, which guarantees that best response functions are uniquely de-
ned. Additionally, in order to have a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, we consider the
usual su¢ cient condition for best response functions to intersect only once.
Assumption 2. For any given strategy pair (si; sj), every player is best response
function satises
@sKi (sj)@si  < 1 where K = fC;NCg, i.e., @2UKi@s2i  <  @2UKi@si@sj , for all i 6= j.
That is, for players with positive concerns about relative comparisons, sCi (sj) crosses
sCj (si) from below, and similarly for players without concerns about comparisons. Let us
henceforth denote by single (double) subscripts in the utility and distance functions their
rst (and second) order derivatives. Next, I start by specifying some properties about the
level of the best response function, whereas lemma 2 determines properties about its slope.
Thereafter, all proofs can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 1. Player is best response function when she assigns a value to relative com-
parisons is above that when she does not, sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj), for all sj, if and only if the
distance function that player i uses to evaluate kindness is increasing in her own strategy,
si, for all si and sj, i.e., Dsi  0 for all si and sj.
Therefore, lemma 1 determines a necessary and su¢ cient condition (Dsi  0) which guar-
antees that player is best response function when she is concerned about relative comparisons
is above that when she is not, sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj), for any actions of player j. Graphically,
lemma 1 can be interpreted as an upward shift in player is best response function, as gure
9 illustrates.
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si
sj
sNCi(sj)
sCi(sj)
Figure 9: Best response function.
Intuitively, if an increase in player is strategy raises the outcome of her distance function
(i.e., if Dsi  0 for all sj) then player is best response function when she assigns a positive
importance to relative comparisons is above that when she does not, i.e., sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj)
for all player js strategies. Interestingly, the case that lemma 1 describes is applicable, for
instance, to games where players are concerned about status acquisition. Specically, note
that the distance function players use as a measure of the status they acquire, Di(si; sj) 
 i(sj   si) = i(si   sj), should clearly satisfy Dsi > 0.
Finally, let UNCsisj represent the cross-derivative between player i and js strategies when
players does not assign a value to social comparisons, and UCsisj be that when they do. In-
tuitively, an increase in this cross-derivative when players become concerned about social
comparisons, from UNCsisj to U
C
sisj
, implies that playersactions become more strategic substi-
tutable. In contrast, a decrease in this cross-derivative means that playersactions become
more complementary to each other.
Lemma 2. If i =
UCsisj
UCsisi
  U
NC
sisj
UNCsisi
 0, then the slope of player is best response function
increases when she assigns a value to social comparisons relative to when she does not; and
decreases otherwise. That is,
If i  (<) 0 then @s
C
i (sj)
@sj
 (<) @s
NC
i (sj)
@sj
for all sj
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si
sj
sNCi(sj)
sCi(sj)
Figure 10: Clockwise rotation, Compensatingtype of player, i < 0.
Thus, lemma 2 species that, when player is utility function satises condition i >
0, her best response function experiences a anticlockwise rotation from sNCi (sj) to s
C
i (sj);
whereas this rotation is clockwise in the case that i < 0, as the gures illustrate.
Graphically, when player is best response function is negatively sloped, these results
imply that sCi (sj) is steeper than s
NC
i (sj) when i < 0, as gure 10 illustrates; while it
determines the opposite when i > 0 as gure 11 indicates. (In contrast, when player
is best response function is positively sloped, lemma 2 species that sCi (sj) is atter than
sNCi (sj) when i < 0 is satised; and steeper otherwise.) In the gures, note that sj 2 Sj
represents the level of player js strategy for which sCi (sj) = s
NC
i (sj).
3
Intuitively, a clockwise rotation can be understood in terms of a greater necessity to com-
pensate player js actions as gure 10 illustrates: when sj < sj player i chooses equilibrium
levels of si above those in the game without concerns for relative comparisons, whereas when
sj > sj player i chooses lower levels of si in equilibrium. This is the case of the public good
games presented in the example of section ve, where player i considers her contributions
to the charity more necessarywhen player j does not reach a minimum level, sj, but her
contributions are less necessary when player j exceeds this level.
3Note that in the case of a clockwise rotation, if sj takes a su¢ ciently high value, then sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj)
for all sj , leading to a similar result to that of lemma 1, illustrated in gure 2(a). Similarly, in the case of
an anticlockwise rotation, if sj takes a su¢ ciently low value, then sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj) for all sj .
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si
sj
sNCi(sj)
sCi(sj)
Figure 11: Anticlockwise rotation, Reciprocatingtype of player, i > 0.
An opposite argument is applicable to anticlockwise rotations of player is best response
functions (i.e., when i < 0) where player i can be interpreted to reciprocate player js
actions. Indeed, player i reduces her strategy choice below that in standard models when
player j does not reach threshold sj. In contrast, when sj > sj player i rewardsplayer j for
exceeding such level. Because of this underlying intuitive reasoning, I dene the reciprocating
and compensating types of players as follows.4
Denition 3. Player is behavior is dened as compensating if and only if her best
response function rotates clockwise (i.e., i < 0 holds). Otherwise, her behavior is recipro-
cating.
3.4 EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
From our previous analysis, one can anticipate that player is equilibrium strategies in this
model, sCi , are higher than in models without concerns about distances, s
NC
i , when s
C
i (sj) >
sNCi (sj) for all sj. That is, when Dsi  0 is satised, as specied in lemma 1. Indeed, in such
4These intuitions also hold when playersbest response functions are positively sloped. Indeed, when
i < 0 one can interpret sCi (sj) being atter than s
NC
i (sj) as that player i compensatesplayer js actions.
On the contrary, when condition i > 0 holds, and sCi (sj) becomes steeper than s
NC
i (sj), one can infer that
player i reciprocatesplayer js strategy.
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cases the consideration of distances shifts upwards player is best response function along all
player js strategies, what leads player i to choose higher equilibrium strategy levels. The
following proposition conrms this result.
Proposition 1. If condition Dsi  0 holds for all si 2 Si and sj 2 Sj, then sCi  sNCi ,
for any reciprocating or compensating behavior of players i and j.
Hence, proposition 1 determines that player is equilibrium strategy when she is con-
cerned about relative comparisons is weakly higher that when she is not, if Dsi  0 holds.
In that case, player is Nash equilibrium strategy increases for any type of player (com-
pensating or reciprocating), and for any distance function players might use (demanding
or not-demanding). This is indeed a useful result, since it allows for a prediction about
the ranking between equilibrium strategies sCi and s
NC
i just by checking whether condition
Dsi  0 holds. As commented above, condition Dsi > 0 is specially relevant in the case of
those players who are concerned about status acquisition. Indeed, as the example of section
ve illustrates, sCi  sNCi is satised for any parameter values when players assign a positive
importance to status, conrming the above result of proposition 1.
One may ask, however, if the above result still holds when condition Dsi  0 is not
satised for all sj, i.e., when the best response function sCi (sj) is above s
NC
i (sj) for some
values of sj but below for others. Indeed, Dsi  0 is a relatively strong condition, which we
henceforth relax. (In particular, we assume that Dsi  0 holds only for some values of si,
whereas Dsi < 0 is satised for others, which leads to best response function s
C
i (sj) to be
above sNCi (sj) for some values of sj but below for others). For expositional clarity, let us
rst analyze the case in which both players are concerned about relative comparisons. Then,
section 4.2 examines the case where player i is the only individual who assigns a value to
these comparisons.
3.4.1 Both players are concerned about comparisons
In this section I examine how the above ranking of equilibrium strategy choices varies when
both players assign a positive importance to the outcome of their distance function. For
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simplicity, let us assume that both playersrelative comparisons are symmetric: ij > 0,
i.e., both players are relative reciprocators or compensators, although the intensityof these
e¤ects does not need to coincide i 6= j.
Proposition 2. Every player is equilibrium strategy satises sCi  sNCi if player i is
either:
1. a compensator using a demanding distance function; or
2. a reciprocator using a not-demanding distance function.
In addition, this result holds both for strategic substitutes and strategic complements.
The gures illustrate the results behind proposition 2 analyzing the ranking of players
equilibrium strategies. In particular, the type of player is represented in rows and the kind
of distance function she uses is in columns. Specically, gure 12 describes the results
for negatively sloped best response functions (strategic substitutes), while 13 summarizes
proposition 2 for the case that playersbest response functions have a positive slope (strategic
complements).
siC<siNC
sjC<sjNC
sjC<sjNC
siC<siNC
Compensators
Reciprocators
DemandingNot demanding
0<D
0>D
DNC<0DNC>0
siC>siNC
siC>siNC
sjC>sjNC
sjC>sjNC
Figure 12: Strategic substitutes.
Interestingly, for the case of strategic complements but also for strategic substitutes,
sCi > s
NC
i and s
C
j > s
NC
j are satised either when: (1) players are compensators with
relatively demanding distance functions; or (2) when players are reciprocators with not-
demanding distance functions. Intuitively, in the rst case player i evaluates player js
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siC<siNC
sjC<sjNC
sjC<sjNC
siC<siNC
Compensators
Reciprocators
DemandingNot demanding
0<D
0>D
DNC<0DNC>0
siC>siNC
siC>siNC
sjC>sjNC
sjC>sjNC
Figure 13: Strategic complements.
actions as relatively low given that she uses a demanding distance function. Additionally,
since she is a compensating type of player, she increases her equilibrium strategy. In con-
trast, in the second case, player i evaluates player js actions as relatively high, given that
she uses a not-demanding distance function. Since, in addition, she is a reciprocating type
of player, she raises her strategy in equilibrium.
Note an interesting implication of these results. In particular, if players compare each
othersactions with respect to the highest choice available to each other (i.e., both players are
extremely demanding), then further cooperation among the players can only be predicted
when individuals are regarded as compensators, e.g., they compensate each otherslack of
contributions to the public good. In contrast, if players compare each othersactions with
respect to the lowest available choice of the other player (and players can then be regarded
as not-demanding), stronger cooperation occurs only when players are reciprocators.
3.4.2 Only player i is concerned about comparisons
Let us now analyze the case in which player i is the only individual concerned about the
outcome of her distance function, i.e. i 6= 0 and j = 0.
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Proposition 3. Consider that i 6= 0 and j = 0 for all j 6= i, then
1. Player is equilibrium strategy satises sCi  sNCi if and only if he is either: (1) a compen-
sator using a demanding distance function; or (2) a reciprocator using a not-demanding
distance function. This result holds both for strategic substitutes and complements.
2. Player js equilibrium strategy satises sCj  sNCj if and only if sCi < sNCi in the case of
strategic substitutes, and if sCi > s
NC
i in the case of strategic complements.
sjC<sjNC
siC<siNC
sjC<sjNC
siC<siNC
Compensator
Reciprocator
DemandingNot demanding
0<Di
0>Di
DNCi<0DNCi>0
0=Dj
sjC>sjNC
sjC>sjNC
siC>siNC
siC>siNC
Figure 14: Strategic substitutes.
sjC<sjNC
siC<siNC
sjC<sjNC
siC<siNC
Compensator
Reciprocator
DemandingNot demanding
0<Di
0>Di
DNCi<0DNCi>0
0=Dj
sjC>sjNC
sjC>sjNC
siC>siNC
siC>siNC
Figure 15: Strategic complements.
The above two gures describe the results of proposition 3, emphasizing the ranking
of player i and js equilibrium strategies when only player i is concerned about relative
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comparisons. In particular, note that the ranking of equilibrium strategy choices for the
concerned individual (player i) coincides with that when both players assign a positive value
to relative comparisons. That is, sCi  sNCi holds in the same contexts regarding player i for
gures 12 and 14 in the case of strategic substitutes, and for gures 13 and 15 in the case of
strategic complements.
On the other hand, player js equilibrium strategy moves in the opposite direction of
player is when actions are strategic substitutes, whereas it moves in the same direction when
they are strategic complements. Intuitively, when playersactions are strategic substitutes,
player j decreases her equilibrium strategy when she knows that player i increases hers, as
gure 14 indicates. In contrast, when playersactions work as strategic complements (as in
gure 15), player j raises her strategy choice when she predicts that player i increases hers
in equilibrium.5
We can extract two main conclusions from the above results. First, a single individ-
ual with positive concerns about social comparisons su¢ ces for higher strategy choices in
equilibrium sCi  sNCi (at least for that player) under certain contexts; and it is valid for
both players if their actions are strategic complements. Second, when both individuals as-
sign a positive importance to social comparisons, playersequilibrium strategies move in the
same direction, i.e., they experience a coordinating e¤ect.Importantly, this result is not
only valid when playersactions are strategic complements, but also when they are strategic
substitutes.
3.4.3 Connection with the literature
In this section, I analyze how the model presented in this paper encompasses certain mod-
els on social preferences and intentions-based reciprocity as special cases, as the following
proposition shows.
5Finally, note that these results can be easily generalized to simultaneous-move games with N players.
In such settings, however, every player measures the kindness he infers from the actually chosen strategies of
each of the other N   1 players. The outcome of each of these individual comparisons can then be added up
(or even scaled in a weighted average), in order to evaluate player is distance function. Despite the greater
generality of such model, nonetheless, its results and intuition are already captured by the two-player setting
I consider in this paper.
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Proposition 4. Assume sRij (si; sj) = si for all sj. Then, the player is preferences
over player js actions can be represented by
UCi (si; sj) = iU
NC
i (si; sj) + jU
NC
j (si; sj) where i; j 2 R
In particular, the above proposition species that when player i compares player js cho-
sen action, sj, with that chosen by her, si, her utility function UCi (si; sj) can be represented
as a weighted average of her material payo¤s and those of player j. Therefore, in such context
our model captures playersconcerns for inequity aversion (or altruism) as a special case,
such as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). In addition, this
model also captures certain concerns about intentions-based reciprocity as a special case.
For example, the above utility representation embodies Charness and Rabins (2002) model6
for the case that player i infers misbehavior from player js actions, and for i = 1   and
j =  . That is,
UCi (si; sj) = (1  )UNCi (si; sj)  UNCj (sj; si)
= UNCi (si; sj) + 

UNCi (si; sj)  UNCj (sj; si)

Finally, note that the model presented in this paper also encompasses contexts in which
players care about social status. Indeed, as commented in section 3, this occurs when players
compare othersactions with respect to her own and they introduce the outcome of this
comparison negatively into her utility function. In particular, the distance function becomes
Di(si; sj)   i(sj   si) = i(si   sj), where player is utility increases when si > sj and
decreases otherwise.
6Clearly, this representation of player is utility function does not capture Charness and Rabins (2002)
complete model, since they analyze other facets of individualsbehavior, such as inequity aversion, in addition
to reciprocity. However, when restricted to intensions-based reciprocity alone, and when player i infers
misbehavior from player js actions, the above utility function coincides with that in Charness and Rabin
(2002).
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3.5 APPLICATION TO PUBLIC GOOD GAMES
In this section, I construct a simple example in which the above general model is applied to
a public good game (PGG). Specically, let us rst assume that player is utility function
coincides with those in standard public good games,
UNCi (si; sj) = [w   si]0:5 + [m(si + sj)]0:5
where w represents the amount of money available for contributions to the public good,
si 2 R+. Hence, w si denotes the remaining units of money which have not been contributed
and that can be used for consumption of private goods. Finally, letm 2 R+ be the (constant)
return from the total contributions to the public good, si+sj. Let us now introduce players
concerns about relative comparisons. In order to be consistent with the above model, let us
rst construct an example of a distance function that increases in player is strategy, i.e.,
Dsi > 0 for all sj, as in the case in which players care about status acquisition. Second, I
analyze an example of a distance function that is not increasing for all player is strategy,
i.e., Dsi > 0 does not hold for all sj.
3.5.1 An example about status acquisition
Let us rst consider that players increase their perception of social status when their contri-
bution to the public good is above that of the other donor, i.e., when si > sj. For simplicity,
let us construct a linear distance function Di   i(sj   si) = i(si   sj), where player i
compares her equilibrium contribution , si, with that of player js , sj. Therefore, player is
utility function becomes
UCi (si; sj) = [w   si]0:5 + [m(si + sj) + (si   sj)]0:5
where i = j =  for simplicity. The next proposition describes player is equilibrium
contribution in this context, and below I compare it with respect to hers in the standard
PGG.
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Proposition 5. In the simultaneous PGG game where players assign a value to status,
every player i = f1; 2g submits a Nash equilibrium contribution of sCi = (+m)
2w
2m+(+m)2
:
Specically, the following corollary shows that, indeed, player is equilibrium contribution
in this model is strictly higher than when she is not concerned about status acquisition (and
generally about distances such that Dsi > 0 for all sj).
Corollary 1. Every player is equilibrium contribution in the simultaneous PGG game,
sCi , when all players assign value to status,  > 0, is (strictly) higher than her contribution
when they do not,  = 0.
Interestingly, this result could be anticipated by directly using proposition 1. Indeed,
since player i can increase the outcome of the distance function by increasing her own strategy
(i.e., Dsi > 0 for all sj as in this case) then the ranking result s
C
i > s
NC
i could be predicted
without the need to nd reduced form solutions for the playersequilibrium contributions.
3.5.2 An example where comparisons are dened over sj
Let us now construct a similar example in order to gain a clearer intuition about proposition
2s results. Particularly, let us assume that player i makes relative comparisons with a
distance function that is not increasing in player is own strategy choice, i.e., Dsi > 0
does not hold for all sj. For example, if player i wants to evaluate player js commitment
with the provision of the public good, she might use distance function Di  i(sj   srefj ),
where sj represents player js equilibrium contribution, and s
ref
j 2 (0; 1) denotes a particular
contribution to the public good that players may have agreed upon before the beginning of
the game, and that player i uses as a reference point to compare sj. Thus, player is utility
function in this model becomes,
UCi (si; sj) = [w   si]0:5 + [m(si + sj) + (sj   srefj )]0:5
Specically, note that player is utility level increases when player j contributes to the
public good above her reference level sj > s
ref
j (for example, more than what she committed
54
to), since player i might infer that player js chosen strategy is a signal of a strong com-
mitment with the provision of the public good. Let us next analyze player is best response
function.
Proposition 6. In the simultaneous PGG game, where every player i = f1; 2g assigns
a value to the distance sj   srefj , player is best response function, sCi (sj), is given by
sCi (sj) =
8><>:
srefj +m
2w
m(1+m)
  +m
m(1+m)
sj if sj 2

0;
srefj +m
2w
+m(2+m)

0 if sj >
srefj +m
2w
+m(2+m)
Comparing it with player is best response function when she assigns no importance to
distances,
sNCi (sj) =
8<: mw1+m   11+msj if sj 2

0; mw
2+m

0 if sj > mw2+m
one can clearly observe two main di¤erences between these best response functions, from
which we can conclude that player i is a compensator. First, the vertical intercept of
sCi (sj) is higher than that of s
NC
i (sj) for any  > 0 and s
ref
j > 0, i.e.,
srefj +m
2w
m(1+m)
> mw
1+m
.
And second, sCi (sj) is steeper than s
NC
i (sj), i.e.,
+m
m(1+m)
> 1
1+m
. Therefore, player is best
response function experiences a clockwise rotation from sNCi (sj) to s
C
i (sj) similar to that
gure 2(b) illustrates. In contrast, when  < 0 player i becomes a reciprocator.Indeed,
the vertical intercept of sCi (sj) is now lower than that of s
NC
i (sj) for any  < 0; in addition,
sCi (sj) is now atter than s
NC
i (sj) since
m 
m(1+m)
< 1
1+m
. Hence, when  < 0 player is best
response function experiences an anticlockwise rotation from sNCi (sj) to s
C
i (sj) similar to that
illustrated in gure 2(c). Given the above results about player is best response function, let
us now determine player is equilibrium contribution to the public good for any value of .
Proposition 7. In the simultaneous PGG game, every player is contribution when both
players assign a value to the distance sj   srefj is given by sCi =
srefj +m
2w
+m(2+m)
.
55
Let us nally compare, alike in the previous example, every player is donation in this
model with respect to hers in the (standard) case when she assigns no value to distances.
Corollary 2. In the simultaneous PGG game, every player is Nash equilibrium con-
tribution when she assigns a value to the distance sj   srefj , sCi , is strictly higher than hers
when she assigns no weight to such distance, sNCi , if
1. players are compensatorsusing a demanding distance function, i.e., conditions  > 0
and sNCj < s
ref
j hold; or
2. players are reciprocatorsusing a not-demanding distance function, i.e., conditions  <
0 and sNCj > s
ref
j hold.
This result conrms proposition 2 in the general description of the model. Indeed, it
species an alternative procedure to check whether sCi > s
NC
i without the need to nd
reduced form solutions for player is equilibrium contribution level. In particular, one just
needs to check the conditions it describes: when players can be regarded as compensators,
sCi > s
NC
i holds if these players use demanding distance functions, s
NC
j < s
ref
j . Otherwise,
when players are regarded as reciprocators,sCi > s
NC
i is satised only if players use not-
demanding distance functions, sNCj > s
ref
j ; as proposition 2 showed.
3.6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzes the e¤ect of playersrelative comparisons on their equilibrium strategies
in simultaneous-move games. In particular, I show that when players relative comparisons
lead them to regard each othersactions as more strategically complementary (players are
regarded as reciprocators), and when they are not-demanding on the actions that they
expect from each other, predicted levels of cooperation among the players are higher when
they care about these comparisons than when they do not. Similarly, when playersconsider-
ations for relative comparisons lead their actions to become more strategically substitutable
(players are regarded as compensators), and they demand high actions from each other,
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playerscooperation is stronger than when they do not. Interestingly, these results are not
only valid for games where playersactions are regarded as strategic complements, but also
for those in which they are strategic substitutes. Therefore, this paper shows the role of so-
cial comparisons as devices of cooperation in a relatively general class of simultaneous-move
games. Specically, these results explain why individuals choose to cooperate even when
they do not assign any value to each otherspayo¤s; a common assumption in the literature
predicting cooperation, which this paper does not consider.
Furthermore, I demonstrate that the results of this paper embed some existing behav-
ioral models: from intentions-based reciprocity and status acquisition. Hence, this paper
furthers our understanding of the facets explaining playersobserved cooperation in multiple
experiments. Let us nally remark some of the several extensions to the model introduced
in this paper. Particularly, note that the action space was exogenously determined before
the beginning of the game. However, it would be interesting to allow players to strategically
select their available choices (their action space) before the game starts, given that the kind-
ness other players perceive from their own choices depends on which actions are not chosen.
This strategic selection of available choices is observed in di¤erent contexts, where a player
uses one of her unchosen alternatives as an excuse to support her actual behavior. Further
research in the e¤ect of relative comparisons in individualsstrategic interaction will indeed
improve our understanding of economic behavior in a greater variety of settings.
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4.0 COMPETITION FOR STATUS ACQUISITION IN PUBLIC GOOD
GAMES
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The e¤ect of status on individualsconsumption of private goods has been extensively an-
alyzed from a theoretical perspective, and conrmed by multiple studies. Indeed, many
authors, starting from Smith (1759) and Veblen (1899), have examined agents incentives
to consume certain positional goods (such as luxury cars) for the only purpose of acquiring
social status among their neighbors, co-workers or friends; see Ball et al. (2001), Frank
(1985) and Hopkins and Kornienko (2004).
Despite the extensive analysis of status in private good settings, there is yet a limited
literature on how social status acquisition may inuence individuals in public good contexts,
and specically in their private contributions to charitable organizations. Nonetheless, the
importance of status as a motive for individual donations cannot be overemphasized. For
example, both BusinessWeek and Slate magazines recently created rankings of the most
generous U.S. philanthropists. More generally, publicizing the list of donors, as well as the
size of their contributions to the charity, constitutes a common practice of many charita-
ble organizations, what suggests that many donors are indeed concerned about how their
contribution is ranked relative to others. In the same spirit, recent experimental literature,
such as Kumru and Vesterlund (2005) and Du¤y and Kornienko (2005), have also conrmed
the role of status as an individual incentive a¤ecting donorsgiving behavior in di¤erent
experimental settings.
This paper contributes to this literature by constructing a theoretical model that analyzes
how individual (and total) contributions to a charity are a¤ected by playerscompetition for
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social status. Intuitively, one may expect every donors giving decision to be increasing in
his value for social status, since this valuation might attenuate his incentives to free-ride
on other donorscontributions. This intuitive prediction is indeed conrmed both in the
simultaneous solicitation order (where both donors give simultaneously to the charity) and
in its sequential version (in which one donor gives rst and then the other gives second before
the end of the game). Similarly, an individuals contribution should also be increasing in the
value that other donors assign to status. Indeed, since an opponent with a higher value for
status increases his contribution, individuals need to increase their donation to the charity
in order to reduce as much as possible their loss of social status; this is conrmed in our
model for both solicitation orders as well.
A question of interest is which particular contribution order raises the highest total
revenue to the charity. In particular, I provide an answer to this questions which can be
directly applied by practitioners. Specically, populations of relatively homogeneous donors
 in terms of the value they assign to status induce a higher competition (and contri-
butions) in the simultaneous public good game than in its sequential version. In contrast,
groups of contributors with heterogeneous values to status submit higher total donations in
the sequential contribution game than in its simultaneous counterpart. Hence, this paper
contributes to the literature on public good games by analyzing which particular solicitation
order raises the highest total revenue to the charity when players compete for social status.
Finally, I examine the possibility that donorssocial status might be acquired from pre-
vious donations to the charity, or from any other sources. This is the case, for example,
of famous philanthropists who start their competition for status with previously acquired
levels of seniority. In particular, I show that if this previous status enters additively into
donorsstatus concerns, seniority may work as an strategic substitute for the status donors
can acquire through current donations, reducing their contributions. In contrast, if cur-
rently acquired status emphasizes previously acquired rankings, then status acquired during
di¤erent periods work as strategic complements, and current donations are increased.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, I discuss the literature
dealing with status, both in a private or public good setting. In section three the model is
presented, and sections four and ve describe the results in terms of the playersequilibrium
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contributions in the simultaneous and sequential games, respectively. In section six, given
the previous results, I nd the contribution mechanism that maximizes the charitys total
revenue. Section seven presents an extension of the previous results, in which I consider the
e¤ect of seniority on current donations. Finally, section eight summarizes the main results
of the paper and comments about its further extensions.
4.2 RELATED LITERATURE
4.2.1 Relative status acquisition
Let us address two main points regarding relative status acquisition as a motive for voluntary
giving to public goods. First, di¤erent papers in the literature on status seeking (or status
acquisition) have dealt with individuals behavior when consuming private goods which may
enhance their relative status over other individuals of their group; see Congleton (1989),
Frank (1985), Ball and Eckel (1998), Ball et al. (2001), and Hopkins and Kornienko (2004).
Most of this literature, however, considers that an individual consuming a private good can
only acquire status if he is the subject consuming the highest amount of that good among
all individuals of his group. Importantly, the status an agent acquires does not depend on
the distance between his consumption and the other individuals consumption. In this paper
I use a less extreme assumption about how status enters into the playersutility function.
Specically, status is increasing in the di¤erence between an individuals contribution and
the donation of the other subject submitting donations to the charity. That is, this paper
introduces the traditional status concerns in private good consumption into a public good
setting, but also modies the usual assumption about how relative status can be acquired.
Hence, every player i is not only concerned about ranking (because the di¤erence between
his contribution to the charity and that of player j is positive), but also about how intense
is this di¤erence.
The second point regarding the consideration of relative status as a motive of voluntary
giving to public goods deals with recent experimental studies on this topic. For instance,
Kumru and Vesterlund (2005) and Du¤y and Kornienko (2005), introduce individual con-
60
cerns about status in the contributors utility function. In the rst of these papers, relative
status is considered to be exogenous, i.e., a player experiences a higher utility derived from
status if he contributes to the same charity as the player with highest status in the group. In
contrast, status acquisition in this paper is endogenous, as in Du¤y and Kornienko (2005),
since every player seeks to acquire a greater relative status in his group by contributing more
than other donors. Their experimental evidence strongly supports our theoretical results.
4.2.2 Strategic role of charities
Until recently, most of the studies in public good games usually consider contributors as
the sole active players of the game, and limit charities to the only role of administering
the funds raised from contributions and the nal production of the public good. This sim-
plifying assumption was probably necessary, in order to clearly understand the motives for
voluntary giving in simplied models. Some recent papers, nevertheless, have begun to
notice the prominent and strategic role that charities can play in voluntary contributions
games, for example when deciding whether contributions should be received simultaneously
or sequentially. In fact some papers even allow the charity to decide between an exoge-
nously determined contribution order and an endogenous one, where contributors are asked
to unanimously vote about the time structure of the game they prefer; see Potters, Sefton
and Vesterlund (2005). This paper goes more in the line of this recent literature since it
assigns charities an strategic role by allowing them to decide which is the optimal solicitation
order, depending on the donorspreferences for relative status acquisition.
4.3 MODEL
Let us consider a public good game (PGG) where N = 2 agents privately contribute to the
provision of a public good. Let gi denote subject is voluntary contributions to the public
good, and let xi  0 represent his consumption of private goods. Additionally, I assume
that the marginal utility individual i derives from his consumption of the private good is
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one. Specically, I use the following quasilinear utility function,1 where private goods enter
linearly, while both total contributions, G, and relative status, statusi, are included in the
nonlinear function v ().
Ui (xi; G; statusi) = xi + v(G; statusi)
As noted above, the term statusi represents the utility that individual i gets from relative
status. In particular, I assume that the status subject i acquires by contributing gi is given
by the di¤erence between his contribution and that of the other player. That is,
statusi = i (gi   gj) for any i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j
First, note that subject i enhances his relative status if his contribution is greater than
individual js; otherwise, if subject j contributes more than he does, then subject i perceives
himself as an individual with lower status than subject j.2 In addition, this di¤erence is
scaled by i, indicating the importance of relative status for subject i, where i 2 [0;+1).
As commented in the previous section, this is a game of complete information. Hence, in
the equilibrium of the PGG, player i correctly conjectures donor js contribution, gj for all
j 6= i, and as a consequence he knows whether he acquires status through his contribution,
gi > gj, or if he does not, gi < gj. Furthermore, all the elements of the game, including the
particular values of i, are assumed to be common knowledge among the players.
For simplicity, I assume the nonlinear function v(G; statusi) = ln [mG+ statusi], where
m 2 [0;+1) denotes the return player i obtains from total contributions to the public good.
Finally, let w represent every players endowment of monetary units that can be distributed
1This quasilinear specication eliminates wealth e¤ects, which may nonetheless exist in some real cases.
Such quasilinear utility function was chosen, however, because: (1) it isolates the e¤ect of status on charitable
contributions (without confounding it with wealth e¤ects); and (2) the use of alternative utility functions
provides similar results to those in this paper without adding signicant intuitions.
2Note that this public good game can be easily generalized to N players. In such setting, every donor
measures the status he acquires by comparing his contribution and that of the other N   1 players. The
outcome of each of these comparisons can then be added up (or scaled in a weighted average) in order to
evaluate player is acquired status. Despite the greater generality of such model, nonetheless, its results and
intuitions are already captured by the two-player setting I consider in this paper.
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between private and public goods consumption. Therefore, the representative contributors
maximization problem is given by
max
xi;G
Ui (xi; G; statusi) = xi + ln [mG+ i (gi   gj)]
subject to xi + gi = w
gi + gj = G
gi; gj > 0
Using xi = w   gi  0, we can simplify the above program to
max
gi0
w   gi + ln [m(gi + gj) + i (gi   gj)]
In particular, the rst term, w  gi, represents the utility derived from the consumption
of the remaining units of money that have not been contributed to the public good3. The
second term denotes, on the one hand, the utility that individual i gets from the consumption
of the total contributions to the public good gi+gj, and on the other hand, the utility derived
from relative status acquisition.
Intuitively, note that in our model an increase in player js contribution, gj, imposes
both a positive and a negative externality on player is utility level. The positive externality
from gj on player is utility is just the usual one arising from the public good nature of
player js contributions. Player js donations, however, impose also a negative externality
on player i since this donation reduces the status perception of player i, i.e., higher gj
decreases i (gi   gj), for any given gi. Finally, note that we do not make any additional
assumption on the quasilinear part of player is utility function in order to guarantee that
it is positive for any parameter values. Indeed, as we show in the next sections, this term is
never negative in equilibrium, since low contributions by player i correspond to those cases
for which i is close to zero.
3Note that allowing for asymmetric monetary endowments, wi 6= wj , would not change our results, since
playersutility function is quasilinear in w.
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4.3.1 Best response function
In order to gain a clearer intuition of the results, let us analyze player is best response
function. Henceforth, all proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Lemma 1. In the simultaneous PGG with player who assign a value to status acquisition,
player is best response contribution level, gi(gj), is
gi(gj) =
8<: 1 +
i m
i+m
gj if gj 2
h
0; m+i
m i
i
, and
0 if gj > m+im i
if i < m. And in the case that i > m, gi(gj) = 1 + i mi+mgj for all gj.
Clearly, when i < m, player is best response function is decreasing in gj, while i > m
implies a positively sloped best response function, as gures 16 and 17 indicate.
Figure 16: Best response gi(gj) when ai < m
In particular, when i < m the positive externality that player js donations impose on
player is utility dominates the negative one, and player i considers player js contributions
as strategic substitutes of his own, as in the usual PGG models without status. On the other
hand, when i > m the negative externality resulting from player js contributions is higher
than the positive externality originated from the public good nature of his contributions. In
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Figure 17: Best response gi(gj) when ai > m
this case, player i considers player js donations as strategic complements to his own, which
leads to the positively sloped best response function depicted in gure 17. In addition, from
the above lemma and discussion, it is easy to infer that the slope of player is best response
function increases in his value to status, i. The following lemma states this result, which
it is applicable both in the simultaneous and sequential PGG.
Lemma 2. Player is best response function, gi(gj), is (weakly) increasing in his value
to status acquisition, i, and (weakly) decreasing in m, for any parameter values.
This result is clear from the above gures. Indeed, gi(gj) pivots upward, with center at
gi = 1, as i increases: from a negative slope when i < m to a positive slope when i > m.
4.4 SIMULTANEOUS CONTRIBUTIONS
After analyzing player is best response function and its interpretation, we can now examine
player is optimal contribution in this simultaneous-move game.
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Proposition 1. In the simultaneous PGG with players who value status acquisition,
player i = f1; 2g submits the following Nash equilibrium contribution level
gSmi =
8>>><>>>:
1 if i > 0 and j = 0
i(j+m)
(i+j)m
if i > 0 and j > 0
0 if i = 0 and j > 0
and gSmi + g
Sm
j = 1 if i = j = 0
Figure 18 illustrates the set of parameter values that support the above di¤erent contri-
bution levels. In particular, gSmi = 1 on the vertical axis of the gure where j = 0; g
Sm
i = 0
on the horizontal axis, where i = 0; and gSmi =
i(j+m)
(i+j)m
when i,j > 0. Intuitively, player
i submits gSmi = 1 when he assigns a value to status and player j does not; submits a zero
contribution when he does not assign any value to status, i = 0, and player j does, j > 04;
and nally submits gSmi =
i(j+m)
(i+j)m
when both players assign a value to status.
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aj
ai=aj
gSmi > gSmj
gSmi < gSmj
gSmi =0
gSmi =1
Figure 18: Equilibrium contributions in Sm
In addition, gure 18 includes the 450  line, where i = j, what divides equilibrium
contribution levels into two parts: an upper division where i > j and as a consequence
gSmi > g
Sm
j , and a lower division where i < j and g
Sm
i < g
Sm
j . This result is very intuitive
given that both playersequilibrium strategies are symmetric up to their individual value to
4Note that zero donations can be alternatively interpreted as players who decide not to participate in the
contribution mechanism.
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status. Hence, in this simultaneous game, the player who assigns the highest value to status
submits the highest donation. Next, the following lemma presents the comparative statics
of player is equilibrium donation.
Lemma 3. In the simultaneous PGG, player is equilibrium contribution, gSmi , is weakly
increasing in his value to status acquisition, i, and in player js value, j, for any parameter
values. Furthermore, gSmi is weakly decreasing in the return, m, that every donor obtains
from total contributions.
That is, a player who values status competes more ferociously when he becomes more
concerned about the status he can acquire through his contributions, but also when his
opponent becomes more concerned about status. Indeed, since his opponent increases his
donation, player i must increase his own as well if he pretends to maintain his level of
social status unchanged. Finally, note that individual donations are decreasing in the return
that every donor obtains from total contributions to the public good. That is, for a given
value of status among donors, individual contributions decrease as his benets from total
contributions to the public good (free-riding e¤ects) dominate his benets from an increase
in his individual contribution (status e¤ects).
These results might be specically vivid in the case of donors helping charities with
low returns from total contributions, such as those operating in distant countries. Indeed,
according to our previous results, a donor would donate more to charities with goals he does
not directly benet from (low returns) than from those he does (high returns), for a given
value of the status he acquires from his donations to either charity. As a consequence of the
above individual giving decision from players i and j, total contributions are the following.
Lemma 4. In the simultaneous PGG total contributions induced from Nash equilibrium
play, GSm, are
GSm =
8>>><>>>:
1 if j = 0 and i > 0
1 +
2ij
(i+j)m
if i > 0 and j > 0
1 if i = 0 and j  0
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Figure 19 represents total contributions in this simultaneous PGG for any i and j;
and gure 20 illustrates the three areas in which total contributions can be divided. In
particular, making use of gure 20, it is immediate to conclude that: (1) when player i
assigns no importance to status but player j does, on the horizontal axis of gure 17, player
j submits gSmj = 1; (2) when the opposite happens, j = 0 and i > 0 on the vertical axis, it
is player i who submits gSmi = 1; and nally (3) when both players are positively concerned
about status, i,j > 0 in the interior points of the gure, both players give positive amounts
and their total contributions are 1 + 2ij
(i+j)m
.
Figure 19: Total contributions GSm
Finally, note that playerstotal contributions when either of them does not value status
coincides with total contributions when none of them does, GSm = 1. Together with its
increasing pattern in i and j, we can conclude that GSm is higher when playersvalue of
status acquisition are relatively homogeneous (450 line) than when they are heterogeneous.
4.5 SEQUENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Let us next examine donors contributions in the sequential PGG, where player i is the
rst donor solicited to contribute (and he can only give once)5. Observing his contribution,
5The assumption that charities only allow donors to give once could be criticized because of being unre-
alistic. Nevertheless, note that this assumption is equivalent to considering that charities allow players to
donate more than once, but they do not reveal donations until the end of the game. Indeed, any of these
interpretations generates the same individual and total contributions.
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Figure 20: Total contributions
player j (the follower) determines his donation using his best response function from lemma
1, gj(gi). By sequential rationality, player i can insert gj(gi) into his utility function to decide
which is the optimal contribution that maximizes his utility.
Proposition 2. In the sequential PGG the following contribution level describes the
subgame perfect equilibrium strategy for player i (rst mover)
gSeqi =
8<: 0 if i 2 [0; i] , andij+3im+jm m2
2m(i+j)
if i 2 (i;+1)
where i =
m(m j)
3m+j
. Similarly, for player j (second mover)
gSeqj =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 if i2 [0; i) ,
1
2

ij
(i+j)m
+ m
i+j
+
4j
j+m
  1

if j< m and i2 [i; ^i) ,
or if j> m and i2 [i;+1), and
0 if j < m and i 2 [^i;+1)
where ^i =
m(32j+m2)
 2j 4jm+m2
.
Let us rst analyze player is decision about contributing positive amounts. From the
above proposition, we know that player i submits a strictly positive contribution if and only
69
Figure 21: Player is equilibrium contribution gSeqi
if i > i. Figure 21 represents player is equilibrium contribution for di¤erent values of i
and j, and gure 22 illustrates cuto¤ level i for di¤erent values of m.
Corollary 1. In the sequential PGG, the rst movers equilibrium contribution, gSeqi ,
satises:
1. gSeqi > 0 when i = 0, if and only if j > m.
2. gSeqi > 0 when i > m, for any j.
That is, when the rst mover does not assign any value to status, i = 0, he submits a
positive contribution when the second movers best response function is positively sloped, i.e.,
j > m; otherwise, when j < m, he submits a zero contribution. Intuitively, a rst mover
with no value for status (as in the rst point of the above corollary) free-rides the responders
contribution when j < m as usual in sequential PGGs without any considerations about
status. The above intuition is illustrated in gure 21, and in particular at the j-axis, where
i = 0. Note that for any value of j such that j < m, player is optimal contribution is
zero, while for any j > m, player i submits positive donations.
On the other hand, the second result of corollary 1 species a condition on player is
value of status, i > m, that leads him to submit positive contributions regardless of the
value that the second mover may assign to status acquisition, j. Graphically, this result is
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Figure 22: Cuto¤ level alpha i for m = 0:5 and m = 0:8.
obvious from gure 21. In particular, any (i; j)-pair satisfying i > m is above the cuto¤
level i for any parameter values, that leads to strictly positive contributions from the rst
mover. Let us next examine some comparative statics about gSeqi in this sequential game.
Lemma 5. In the sequential PGG with players who assign a value to status, gSeqi is
weakly increasing both in his own value for status acquisition, i, and in player js value, j,
for any parameter values.
The intuition behind these results coincides with that arising from the comparative statics
of gSmi in the simultaneous game, and I refer to section four for a discussion of its interpre-
tation. Let us now analyze under which parameter values player i decides to contribute a
donation that cannot be exceeded by player j, and guarantees himself, as a consequence, a
greater relative status.
Lemma 6. In the sequential PGG with players who assign a value to status, the rst
mover contributes a strictly higher donation than the second mover, gSeqi > g
Seq
j , if and only
if his value for status, i, satises i > i , where 

i =
2j+m
2
2m
.
Specically note that, as the gure 23 illustrates, pairs of parameter values above the
isolevel curve i support g
Seq
i > g
Seq
j , while those below support g
Seq
i < g
Seq
j , keeping the
return from total contributions, m, constant.
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αi
αj
α*i
giSeq>gjSeq
giSeq<gjSeq
Figure 23: Isolevel curve ai .
Intuitively, when the rst mover assigns high values to status and the second does not
(i > i and j < 

i ) the rst donor induces the second mover to give upfrom the compe-
tition by submitting a su¢ ciently high contribution that the second donor cannot protably
exceed. On the contrary, when the second mover is the only player with a relatively high
value for status (i < i and j > 

i ) the rst donor submits a relatively low contribu-
tion, what tempts the second mover with the possibility of winning the competition for
status by contributing a high donation to the charity. Let us next analyze the charitys total
revenues in this sequential solicitation mechanism.
Lemma 7. In the sequential PGG total contributions induced from the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of the game, GSeq, are
GSeq =
8>>><>>>:
1 if i 2 [0; i)
2j
j+m
+
i(j+m)
(i+j)m
if j < m and i 2 [i; ^i), or if j > m and i 2 [i;+1)
ij+3im+jm m2
2m(i+j)
if j < m and i 2 [^i;+1)
Interestingly, when player i assigns a su¢ ciently low value to status acquisition, i < i,
he does not contribute and player j responds by contributing one. In this case, GSeq = 1,
and the results resemble those in sequential PGG models without status considerations, i =
j = 0. In contrast, when player i assigns a su¢ ciently high value to status, i 2 [i; ^i),
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and j > m, he contributes positive amounts which are then reciprocated by the positive
contributions of player j, leading to the total contributions specied above. Finally, if i > ^i
and player js best response function is negatively sloped, j < m, player i contribution
crowds-out all protable donations by player j, and he is the only donor contributing to the
charity.
Corollary 2. Total contributions in the PGG where players assign a value to status ac-
quisition, are weakly higher than when players do not, both in the simultaneous and sequential
mechanism, and for any parameter values.
Intuitively, the private benet from status arising from a players individual contribution
introduces further incentives to give to the charity, in addition to the usual incentives to
the public good provision. Interestingly, this result is related with that of Morgans (2000),
in which he shows that when charities use lotteries in their fundraising campaigns, total
revenues are higher under both solicitation mechanisms.
4.6 COMPARING CONTRIBUTION MECHANISMS
Di¤erent questions naturally arise from the above results. For example, given a particular
pair of playersvalues for status, (i; j), under what contribution order does player i (or
player j) contribute more? Or, what contribution order maximizes total donations received
by the charity? Let us rst compare individual contributions, and then extend our results
to the total revenues received by the charity.
Lemma 8. Player is equilibrium contributions in the simultaneous and sequential PGG
satisfy gSmi > g
Seq
i if and only if: (1) i > m and j > m, or (2) i < m and j < m, for
all i = f1; 2g and j 6= i. Similarly, for player j, gSmj > gSeqj , if and only if i > m.
That is, when playersvalue of status is relatively homogenous, i.e., i > m and j > m
(or if i < m and j < m), the rst mover contributes more in the simultaneous PGG
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than in its sequential version. This result is indicated in gure 24, where the rst and third
quadrant illustrate parameter combinations for which player i submits higher contributions
in the simultaneous than in the sequential game, i.e., gSmi > g
Seq
i . If, on the contrary, players
value of status is relatively heterogeneous, i.e., if i > m and j < m for all j 6= i, then the
above inequality is reversed, i.e., gSmi < g
Seq
i , represented in the second and fourth quadrants.
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giSm<giSeq
gjSm>gjSeq
giSm>giSeq
gjSm>gjSeq
giSm>giSeq
gjSm<gjSeq
giSm<giSeq
gjSm<gjSeq
Figure 24: Comparison of individual contributions
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Figure 25: Revenue comparisons.
In the case of player j, note that he submits gSmj > g
Seq
j if player is best response
function is positively sloped, i > m. Intuitively, when i > m player i (the rst mover in
the sequential game) induces player j to give-upfrom the competition for social status by
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submitting a su¢ ciently high donation. In contrast, when i < m player i temptsplayer
j to win the competition for social status by submitting a su¢ ciently low contribution
which can be easily exceeded. After describing the ranking of individual contributions in
the simultaneous and sequential mechanisms, let us now analyze how it translates into total
contributions.
Proposition 3. Total contributions under the simultaneous PGG are higher than under
the sequential PGG, GSm > GSeq, if and only if
i > m and j > m, or
i < m and j < m
The results from this proposition are graphically illustrated in gure 25. Shaded areas in-
dicate sets of parameters values for which the simultaneous contribution mechanism provides
higher revenues to the charity than the sequential game, GSm > GSeq, whereas unshaded
areas support the contrary, i.e., GSm < GSeq.
Let us rst elaborate on those parameter values supporting GSm > GSeq, where i > m
and j > m (or where i < m and j < m), i.e., playersassign a relatively homogenous
value to status. In the rst case, when both donors assign a high value to status, i > m
and j > m, competition for social status between players is so intense in the simultaneous
version of the game that GSm > GSeq. On the other hand, when both players assign a low
value to status, i.e., i < m and j < m, we nd equilibrium predictions resembling those
in PGGs where players do not care about status. In particular, now both players consider
each otherscontributions as strategic substitutes, since the benets they experience from
the public good dominate those of acquiring social status. Therefore, the rst mover reduces
his contribution anticipating that the second donor will increase his, what he then free-rides.
Since, in addition, the second mover does not increase his donation enough to compensate
for such a decrease, we observe GSm > GSeq.
Let us now analyze those parameter values for which GSm < GSeq, what occurs when
donors are relatively heterogeneous in the value they assign to status acquisition, i.e., i > m
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and j < m for all i = f1; 2g and j 6= i. As described in the previous section, when i > m
and j < m the rst donor (who assigns a relatively high value to status) induces the second
mover (who does not) to give upfrom the competition by submitting a su¢ ciently high
contribution, which cannot be exceeded by the second donor.
On the other hand, when the second mover is the only player who assigns a relatively
high value to status, i < m and j > m, the rst donor submits a low contribution, that
tempts the second mover with the chance of winning the competition by contributing
a higher donation to the charity. Ultimately, the rst movers incentives to induce the
second donor to give up the competition for status (or to be tempted to win) leads
to GSm < GSeq. Finally, note that when both players assign the same value to status
acquisition, i = j, as illustrated in the 450 line of gure 25, total contributions satisfy
GSm > GSeq, for any parameter values.6 This particular revenue ranking result uses Romano
and Yildirims (2001) model, who provide a general framework with which to compare total
revenues in simultaneous and sequential public good games. Unlike Romano and Yildirim
(2001), this paper provides a ranking for individual contributions between the simultaneous
and sequential solicitation mechanisms.
4.7 EXTENSION: SENIORITY IN STATUS
Previous sections considered that individuals can only acquire status through their donations
while playing the PGG. Donors, however, were not allowed to start the voluntary contribution
game with some previous status arising, for example, from their prior donations to the
charity during past solicitation mechanisms, or from any other source (i.e., previous seniority
in status). In this section, I analyze how our results would change when allowing for such
seniority in status.7 In particular, assuming that players i and j start the PGG with previous
6This result constitutes a generalization of that in Varian (1994) who determines that GSm > GSeq when
i = j = 0 in the standard public good game where players do not assign any value to status acquisition.
7Note that I consider previously acquired status (seniority) in this extension of the paper in order to
analyze how such seniority would modify our results regarding playerscompetition for status. However, it
would be interesting to examine donorscontribution decisions during di¤erent periods in an intertemporal
model of charitable contributions.
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seniority levels of Si and Sj respectively, their utility function becomes
Ui = w   gi + ln [m (gi + gj) + i (Si + gi   gj)]
Let us rst examine playersindividual contributions in both the simultaneous and the
sequential-move game.
Proposition 4. In the simultaneous and sequential PGG, with players who assign a
value to status acquisition, i; j > 0, and seniority in status is given by Si and Sj, player
is equilibrium contribution is weakly decreasing in his own seniority in status, Si, for any
parameter values. In addition, player is equilibrium contribution is also weakly increasing
in the other players seniority in status, Sj, if and only if i < m.
That is, the seniority player i acquires in previous rounds of the game works as a sub-
stitute of the status that he can acquire today by raising his contribution to the charity8.
Nonetheless, a greater seniority of player j, Sj, leads player i to increase his contribution
only if his own concern for status satises i < m and thus his best response function is
downward sloping, i.e., he decreases his donation as a result of player js contributions.
Since, in addition, an increase in player js seniority, Sj, reduces her contributions today,
then we obtain that higher seniority levels for player j nally increase player is donation.
Let us now nally determine which solicitation order generates the highest revenue for the
charity. Since our results from section six are not modied, we refer to that section and to
gure 24 for a discussion of their intuition.
Proposition 5. Total contributions under the simultaneous PGG are higher than under
the sequential PGG, GSm > GSeq, when seniority is considered, Si; Sj > 0, if and only if
i > m and j > m, or i < m and j < m.
8This result is a consequence of how seniority in status enters into playersutility function. If seniority
entered scaling up the di¤erence between individual contributions, i.e., i (gi   gj)Si, an increase in Si would
have the same e¤ect in player is equilibrium donations as a raise in i. That is, status acquired during
previous and current periods would work as strategic complements, and an increase in Si would lead player i
to raise her contribution gi. More empirical research is needed, however, to exactly determine how seniority
in status enters into donorspreferences.
77
4.8 CONCLUSIONS
Recent experimental evidence (as well as casual observation) support status acquisition as an
individual incentive for charitable giving. Nonetheless, and despite its interest, relatively few
studies have analyzed this topic from a theoretical approach. This paper analyzes relative
status acquisition as an additional incentive to contribute to PGGs, and unlike recent papers
on this literature, I dene playersstatus as the di¤erence between their own donation and
that of others. As expected, contributorsgiving decisions are increasing both in their own
concerns for status, i, and that of the other donor, j. This pattern clearly reects donors
competition in their contributions with the objective of acquiring higher social status, which
is conrmed both in the simultaneous and sequential solicitation mechanisms. In addition, I
identify what parameter values induce the charity to choose a simultaneous over a sequential
contribution order. In particular, I show that the charity prefers simultaneous PGGs when
players are su¢ ciently homogeneous in the relative value they assign to status acquisition9.
Otherwise, the charity prefers the sequential mechanism.
In an extension, I analyze how the above results would be modied if we allow donors
to start their competition for status acquisition with previously acquired stocksof status,
i.e., seniority in status. In particular, the results in terms of what contribution mechanism
is more protable for the charity are not changed. However, several insights about the role
of seniority in status are obtained. Specically, I demonstrate that when previous status
enters additively into donorsconcerns, seniority may work as an strategic substitute for the
status that donors can acquire through current donations, reducing their contributions. In
contrast, if currently acquired status emphasizes previously acquired rankings, then status
acquired during di¤erent periods works as strategic complements, and current donations are
increased.
Di¤erent extensions of this paper would enhance our understanding of the role of status
acquisition in PGG. First, it would be interesting to analyze how a charity can inuence
donorsconcerns about status, by inducing on them higher or lower preferences for status
acquisition. Similarly, another extension of this paper could go in the direction of considering
9This result is also to that of Dixit (1987) for contests where players expend e¤ort to win a certain prize.
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status gathering in PGGs with incomplete information. In such settings contributors do not
know each others preferences for status, which is closer to many real-life situations, where
donors may have a common understanding of the return from the public good, but may
not know each otherspreferences for status acquisition. Further research in this area can
certainly provide additional insights about donorsincentives to contribute to charities, how
status acquisition a¤ects their giving decisions and, nally, how does it lead them to compete
in their contributions.
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5.0 APPENDIX
5.1 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
5.1.1 Figure 26
Figure 26: Assumption 5(a)
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5.1.2 Figure 27
Figure 27: Assumption 5(b)
5.1.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Since sNCi (sj) and s
C
i (sj), then
@sCi (sj)
@sj
=
@sNCi (sj)
@sj
+
"
1  @s
Ri
j (si; sj)
@sj
#
where @Di(si;sj)
@sj
= 1   @s
Ri
j (si;sj)
@sj
given that Di (si; sj)  sj   sRij (si; sj). Hence, @s
C
i (sj)
@sj

@sNCi (sj)
@sj
since 1  @s
Ri
j (si;sj)
@sj
by denition.
81
5.1.4 Proof of Proposition 1
We rst show that player is best response functions when she is concerned about player
js foregone options and when she is not, respectively, sCi (sj) 2 argmax
si2Si
UCi (si; sj), and
sNCi (sj) 2 argmax
si2Si
UNCi (si; sj), contain a single point. Then, we show the result stated in
proposition 1.
Note that player is utility function when she is concerned about player js unchosen
alternatives, UCi (si; sj), is strictly concave in si and it is dened over a strictly convex
domain. This guarantees that player is best response function sCi (sj) 2 argmax
si2Si
UCi (si; sj)
contains a single point. A similar argument is also applicable for player is utility function
when she does not assign any relevance to player js foregone options, UNCi (si; sj), since it is
also strictly concave in si and it is dened over a strictly convex domain. Hence, sNCi (sj) 2
argmax
si2Si
UNC(si; sj) also contains a single point.
Once we know that player is best response function is unique, we just have to compare
them in the intervals where Di (si; sj)  0 and Di (si; sj) < 0 in order to check if proposition
1 is satised. Let us show it by contradiction. Hence, let us assume that sCi (sj) < s
NC
i (sj)
when sj  sRij (si; sj) (i.e. Di (si; sj)  0). Then, for a function ~si (sj) 2 Si su¢ ciently close
to sNCi (sj),
UCi
 
sNCi (sj) ; sj
 UCi (~si (sj) ; sj)  UNCi (sNCi (sj) ; sj)  UNCi (~si (sj) ; sj) = 0
That is, player is marginal utility of raising her strategy when evaluated at the maximizer
when she is unconcerned about foregone options, sNCi (sj), is below the marginal utility she
could achieve by using this same strategy sNCi (sj) when she is not concerned about player
js unchosen alternatives, which is by denition zero. But this would violate assumption A5
(reciprocity), which states that, when Di (si; sj)  0,
UCsi (si; sj)  UNCsi (si; sj)
must hold for any action s0i su¢ ciently close to si, including s
NC
i (sj). Hence, s
C
i (sj) <
sNCi (sj) when Di (si; sj)  0 cannot be true. Similarly for sCi (sj) > sNCi (sj) when we have
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that Di (si; sj) < 0. Hence, it can only be true that
sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj) for all Di (si; sj) > 0
sCi (sj) < s
NC
i (sj) for all Di (si; sj)  0
5.1.5 Proof of Lemma 2
From proposition 1 we know that the di¤erence between player is best response function
when she is concerned and unconcerned about foregone options, sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj), is weakly
increasing in the distance Di (si; sj). In addition, by assumption A1 we have that player js
utility function UNCj (sj; si) is strictly increasing in si. Hence,
UNCj
 
sj; s
C
i (sj)
  UNCj  sj; sNCi (sj) is weakly increasing in Di (si; sj)
Therefore, for two actions sj; s0j 2 Sj such that s0j > sj, we have that Di
 
si; s
0
j

>
Di (si; sj), what implies that
UNCj
 
s0j; s
C
i
 
s0j
  UNCj  s0j; sNCi  s0j  UNCj  sj; sCi (sj)  UNCj  sj; sNCi (sj)
and rearranging,
UNCj
 
s0j; s
C
i (sj)
  UNCj  sj; sCi (sj)  UNCj  s0j; sNCi  s0j  UNCj  sj; sNCi (sj)
5.1.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Let us sCj and s
NC
j denote the leaders equilibrium strategies when dealing with a concerned
and not concerned follower, respectively. Let us prove sCj > s
NC
j by contradiction. Hence,
assume that sCj < s
NC
j . If this is the case, then the leaders marginal utility from raising her
action must be higher when the follower is unconcerned about foregone options than when
he assigns a positive importance to them. But this contradicts lemma 2. In particular, recall
that lemma 2 states that the marginal utility of raising the proposers action is higher for
the rst mover when the second mover is concerned about unchosen alternatives than when
he is not. Hence sCj < s
NC
j must be false, and proposition 2 is satised.
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5.1.7 Proof of Proposition 3
Using Segal and Sobel (1999), we know that player is preferences over player js actions can
be represented by
UCi (si; sj) = iU
NC
i (si; sj) + jU
NC
j (sj; si) where i; j 2 R
if preferences satisfy continuity and independence, as well as Segal and Sobels (1999) con-
dition (F) which states that
if UNCi (s
0
i; sj) = U
NC
i (si; sj) , then s
0
i i si (F)
which are all satised in our model.
5.1.8 Proof of Lemma 3
Let us consider the receivers utility function when he assigns a positive importance to the
proposers foregone options and when he does not, respectively, UCi (si; sj; Sj) = xi+i(xi 
fi), and UNCi (si; sj) = xi. First, assumption A1 is satised since U
NC
i
 
A; s0j
  UNCi  A; s0j
and UNCi
 
R; s0j
  UNCi (R; sj) for all sj since x0i > xi if and only if s0j > sj. Additionally,
A2 (concavity) is satised since
@2UCi
 
UNCi ; Di

@s2i
=
@2UNCi (si; sj)
@s2i
= 0
A3 is trivially satised by player i. Regarding assumption A4 (kindness) is satised since
UCi (si; sj) > U
NC
i (si; sj) since xi + i(xi f i) > xi if xi> f i
UCi (si; sj) = U
NC
i (si; sj) since xi + i(xi f i) = xi if xi= f i
UCi (si; sj) < U
NC
i (si; sj) since xi + i(xi f i) < xi if xi< f i
Finally, A5 (reciprocity) is also satised, since in their model, s0i > si, if and only if
s0i = A and si = R, what implies that for all Di(si; sj)  0 (i.e., xi  fi)
UCi (s
0
i; sj)  UCi (si; sj)  UNCi (s0i; sj)  UNCi (si; sj)
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() xi + i(xi f i)  0  xi   0 for any xi < fi
and when Di(si; sj) < 0 (i.e., xi < fi), since
[xi + i(xi   fi)]  0 < xi   0 for any xi < fi
5.1.9 Proof of Lemma 4
Let (xj; xi) denote the proposed allocation that the proposer o¤ers to the responder. We
know that the responder will accept any o¤er xi if and only if the utility he gets by accepting
is weakly above than the (zero) utility he gets by rejecting. That is, xi + i(xi   fi) = 0
() xi = i1+ifi.
Let us now check for su¢ ciency. Note that the responder does not to accept any o¤er
xi < xi. Instead, accepting any o¤er xi < xi would imply negative utility levels, and the
responder would be better o¤ by rejecting such an o¤er, obtaining zero utility. Thus, xi < xi
cannot be an equilibrium strategy.
Finally we need to check that the responder does not reject any o¤er above xi. Let us
assume that the responder sets an acceptable threshold x^i > xi. Then, any o¤er xi such that
xi < xi < x^i would be rejected, and the responder would nd that accepting it constitutes a
protable deviation. Therefore, the acceptance threshold cannot be strictly above xi. Hence,
the responder does not accept any o¤er xi 2 [0; xi), but accepts any o¤er weakly above this
threshold level xi.
5.1.10 Proof of Proposition 4
From lemma 8 we know the responders acceptance threshold. Since the proposer wants to
maximize the remaining portion of the pie which is not o¤ered to the receiver and guarantees
that the receiver accepts such divisionhe o¤ers i
1+i
fi. This is preferred by the proposer
rather than not participating when his remaining share of the pie 1   i
1+i
fi > 0. That is,
the proposer makes the minimal o¤er i
1+i
fi if and only if fi < 1+ii . Since fi 2 [0; 1] and
1 < 1+i
i
for any i  0, then the previous condition fi < 1+ii is satised for any i  0.
Therefore, the proposer makes the minimal o¤er i
1+i
fi for any parameter values.
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5.1.11 Proof of Lemma 5
Let us consider the workers utility function when he assigns a positive importance to the
proposers foregone options and when he does not. Respectively, UCi (si; sj) = xi e2+i(xi 
fi)e and UNCi (si; sj) = xi   e2. Therefore, assumption A1 is satised since UNCi
 
si; s
0
j
 
UNCi (si; sj) for any si and any s
0
j > sj since
@UNCi (si;sj)
@sj
= 1  0. Additionally, A2 (concavity)
is also satised since
@2UCi (si; sj)
@e2
=
@2UCi (si; sj)
@e2
=  2 < 0
A3 is trivially satised by player i. Additionally, A4 (kindness) holds since
UCi (si; sj) > U
NC
i (si; sj) since xi   e2 + i(xi   fi)e > xi   e2 for any xi > fi
UCi (si; sj) = U
NC
i (si; sj) since xi   e2 + i(xi   fi)e = xi   e2 for any xi = fi
UCi (si; sj) < U
NC
i (si; sj) since xi   e2 + i(xi   fi)e < xi   e2 for any xi < fi
On the other hand, A5 (reciprocity) as well since si = e and
@UCi (si;sj)
@e
=  2e+ (xi   fi)
and @U
NC
i (si;sj)
@e
=  2e, then
@UCi (si; sj)
@e
 (<)@U
NC
i (si; sj)
@e
if Di (si; sj)  (<) 0
5.1.12 Proof of Lemma 6
The workers optimal amount of e¤ort to exert as a function of the wage proposal o¤ered by
the rm, e(xi), can be obtained from solving the following utility maximization problem
max
e2R+
UCi (si; sj) = xi   e2 + i(xi   fi(xi))e
Di¤erentiating with respect to e, and manipulating, we have
e(xi) =
8<: 12i (xi   fi(xi)) if xi > fi(xi)0 otherwise
For su¢ ciency, just note that the worker will never respond to an o¤er xi by exerting a
higher e¤ort level than the one specied in e(xi). Indeed, on the one hand, if he exerts higher
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e¤ort levels, he will have more disutility from such e¤ort than the utility he derives from
the third term of the above utility function for xi > fi(xi). On the other hand, if he exerts
less e¤ort, then the marginal utility from exerting additional e¤ort when xi > fi (third term
of the utility function) would be greater than the marginal disutility from exerting e¤ort
(second term). Hence, the worker would be better o¤ by exerting more e¤ort. Hence, the
above e¤ort level e(xi) is optimal for the worker when the wage o¤ered is xi.
5.1.13 Proof of Proposition 5
As shown in the above lemma 2, the workers optimal e¤ort level is given by
e (xi) = max

1
2
i (xi   fi(xi)) ; 0

:
Regarding the employer o¤er,we know that the employer inserts the above best response
function into his utility function, in order to nd the optimal wage o¤er. max
xi2[0;1]
(v xi)e(xi).
Hence,
xi =
v (1  f 0i(xi )) + fi(xi)
2  f 0i(xi )
2 argmax (v   xi)e(xi)
Note that the employer prefers to o¤er xi =
v(1 f 0i(xi ))+fi(xi)
2 f 0i(xi ) , where x

i > fi(x

i ) since
v > 1 and f 0i(xi) < 1, and induce a positive e¤ort level from the worker, rather than
o¤ering any wage level x^i < fi(x^i) which induces no e¤ort; see e (xi). Indeed, the employers
equilibrium utility level from o¤ering xi is V = (v   xi ) 12i (xi   fi(xi )), which is positive
for any parameter values. Instead, if the employer makes any o¤er x^i < fi(x^i), the worker
exerts no e¤ort, and UF = 0. Hence, xi is indeed the equilibrium wage o¤er.
Finally, in order to check for the workers voluntary participation, we need to nd what is
the minimum o¤er to be accepted by the worker. That is, we must nd a wage o¤er sj = xi
such that UC(si; sj; Sj) = 0.
xi   e(xi)2 + i(xi   fi(xi))e(xi) = 0
() xi  

max

1
2
i(xi   fi(xi)); 0
2
+ i(xi   fi)max

1
2
i(xi   fi(xi)); 0

= 0
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In the case in which the foregone option fi(xi) > xi, then the above expression is reduced
to xi = 0. That is, any wage o¤er is accepted. On the other hand, in the case in which
fi(xi) < xi, then, we can reduce the above expression to xi =
 2+2i fi(xi)+2
p
1 2i fi(xi)
2i
, which
is always negative, for any values of i and fi(xi). Therefore, the minimum o¤er to be
accepted by the worker in both cases (xi > fi(xi) and xi < fi(xi)) will be xi = 0, since
we are assuming that the rm cannot make any negative o¤ers. Note that in the case that
f 0i(xi) = 0 then x

i becomes x

i =
v+fi(xi)
2
.
5.1.14 Proof of Lemma 7
Let us consider the responders utility function when he assigns a positive importance to the
proposers foregone options and when he does not, respectively,
UCi (si; sj) = zi +

m (si + sj)

1 + i
 
sj   sRj
0:5
and UNCi (si; sj) = zi + [m(si + sj)]
0:5
Therefore, assumption A1 is satised since UNCi
 
si; s
0
j
  UNCi (si; sj) for any si and sj > sj
given that @U
NC
i (si;sj)
@sj
= m
2[m(si+sj)]
0:5 > 0 for any parameter values.
Similarly, A2 (concavity) is also satised since
@2UCi (si; sj)
@s2i
=   m
2
4 [m (si + sj)]
3=2
 0
@2UCi (si; sj)
@s2i
=   m
2(1 + i(sj   sRj ))2
4

m(si + sj)

1 + i(xi   sRj )
3=2  0
A3 is trivially satised by player i. In addition, A4 (kindness) is satised given that
UCi (si; sj) > U
NC
i (si; sj) for any sj > s
R
j
UCi (si; sj) = U
NC
i (si; sj) for any sj = s
R
j
UCi (si; sj) < U
NC
i (si; sj) for any sj < s
R
j
On the other hand, A5 (reciprocity) holds as well since
@UCi (si; sj)
@si
=  1 + m(1 + i(sj   s
R
j ))
2

m(si + sj)

1 + i(sj   sRj )
0:5 and
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@UNCi (si; sj)
@si
=  1 + m
2 [m(si + sj)]
0:5
then it is easy to show that
@UCi (si; sj)
@si
 (<)@U
NC
i (si; sj)
@si
if sj  (<)sRj
5.1.15 Proof of Lemma 8
The responders utility maximization problem is just given by
max
zi;G
UCi (si; sj) = max
zi;G
zi +

mG

1 + i
 
sj   sRj
0:5
subject to zi + si = wi
si + sj = G
si; zi > 0
Using zi = wi   si and si + sj = G in UCi (si; sj), we can reduce the above program to
max
si
UCi (si; sj)= max
si
w
i
 si+

m (si + sj)

1 + i
 
sj   sRj
0:5
Di¤erentiating with respect to si, and manipulating, we nd the best response function
for the second mover concerned about the rst movers foregone options.
sCi (sj) =
8><>:
m(1 isRj )
4
   1 + im
4

sj if sj 2

0;
m(1 isRj )
4 im

0 if sj  m(1 is
R
j )
4 im
89
5.1.16 Proof of Lemma 9
Regarding the rst mover (player i), we know that he inserts the above best response function
of the follower into his utility function, UNCj (sj; si) = w  sj + [m (si + sj)]0:5which is maxi-
mized at sj =
16(isRj  1)+2im2
16i
. However, this expression is positive only for su¢ ciently high
values of i. In particular,
16(isRj  1)+2im2
16i
> 0 if and only if i > 1616sRj +m
= i. Therefore,
sj =
8<: 0 if i < i16(isRj  1)+2im2
16i
otherwise
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5.2 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
5.2.1 Proof of Lemma 1
I rst show that player is best response functions when she is concerned about distanceDi()
and when she is not, respectively, sCi (sj) 2 argmax
si
UCi (si; sj), and s
NC
i (sj) 2 argmax
si
UNCi (si; sj), contain a single point. Then, I show the result stated in lemma 1.
Note that player is utility function when she is concerned about Di(), UCi (si; sj), is
strictly concave in si and it is dened over a strictly convex domain SiSj. This guarantees
that player is best response function
sCi (sj)2 argmax
si
UCi (si; sj)
contains a single point. A similar argument is also applicable for player is utility function
when she does not assign any relevance to distance Di(), UNCi (si; sj), since it is also strictly
concave in si and it is dened over a strictly convex domain Si  Sj. Hence,
sNCi (sj)2 argmax
si
UNCi (si; sj)
also contains a single point.
Next, I want to show that UCsi (si; sj)  UNCsi (si; sj) holds if and only if sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj)
for all sj. First, suppose by contradiction, that UCsi (si; sj)  UNCsi (si; sj) but sCi (sj) <
sNCi (sj) for all si and sj. Let us then take a linear combination s^i(sj) of these two best
response functions, sCi (sj) and s
NC
i (sj), such that
s^i(sj) = s
C
i (sj) + (1  ) sNCi (sj) for all sj, where  2 (0; 1)
When UNCsi (si; sj) is evaluated at s^i(sj), we must have U
NC
si
(s^i(sj); sj) > 0. However, if
sCi (sj) < s
NC
i (sj), then U
C
si
(s^i(sj); sj) < 0. Therefore,
UCsi (s^i(sj); sj) < U
NC
si
(s^i; sj) , which is a contradiction.
Hence, if UCsi (si; sj)  UNCsi (si; sj) for all si and sj then sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj) for all si and sj.
Let us next show that if sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj) for all si and sj, then UCsi (si; sj)  UNCsi (si; sj)
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for all si and sj. Suppose by contradiction that sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj) for all sj, but UCsi (si; sj) <
UNCsi (si; sj) for some si and sj. Then, s
C
i (sj) < s
NC
i (sj) would hold for some si and sj, which
is a contradiction. Thus, UCsi (si; sj)  UNCsi (si; sj) holds if and only if sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj) for
all sj.
Applying this condition to player is utility function, we have UNCsi (si; sj) = Usi and
UCsi (si; sj) = U
C
si
 
UNCi ; Di

. Hence, UCsi (si; sj) = Usi + UDiDsi. Thus, U
C
si
(si; sj) 
UNCsi (si; sj) in this context means Usi+UDiDsi  Usi, which reduces to UDiDsi  0. Finally,
since UDi  0 given that positive distances increase playersutility level (kindness assump-
tion), condition UDiDsi  0 can be reduced to Dsi  0. Hence, sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj) is satised
for all sj if and only if condition Dsi  0 holds for all si and sj.
5.2.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Let us rst nd the slope of player is best response function in the standard game without
concerns about distances. Applying the implicit function theorem, we have @s
NC
i (sj)
@sj
=  U
NC
sisj
UNCsisi
.
Let us now compare it with the slope of player is best response function when player i is
concerned about distances. Applying the implicit function theorem again, @s
C
i (sj)
@sj
=  U
C
sisj
UCsisi
.
Comparing the absolute value of both slopes, @s
C
i (sj)
@sj
>
@sNCi (sj)
@sj
holds if and only if
i =
UCsisj
UCsisi
  U
NC
sisj
UNCsisi
> 0.
5.2.3 Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 1 we know that if Dsi  0 holds for all sj, then sCi (sj) > sNCi (sj) for all sj.
Now we want to show that if sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj) for all sj, then sCi  sNCi . Suppose by
contradiction that sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj) for all sj, but sCi < sNCi . Since this counterpositive
statement must be true for any slopes of player i and js best response functions, it must
also be true when sCi (sj) and s
NC
i (sj) are both negatively sloped, and when player j is not
concerned about distances, i.e., sCj (sj) = s
NC
j (sj). In this case, if s
C
i < s
NC
i then, either
1. sCi (sj) < s
NC
i (sj) for all sj, and
@sKi (sj)@sj  < 1 for all i 6= j and K = fC;NCg, or
2. sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj) for all sj, and
@sKi (sj)@sj  > 1 for all i 6= j and K = fC;NCg,
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which are both a contradiction. Thus, if sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj) for all sj, then sCi  sNCi .
5.2.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Let us rst nd an useful result about player is best response functions when evaluated at
sj = s
NC
j .
Lemma A. If assumptions 1 and 2 are satised, then for every player i = f1; 2g,

i DNCi
 sCi (sNCj )  sNCi (sNCj ) > 0
Proof of Lemma A:
We want to show that if i DNCi > 0 then sCi (sNCj ) > sNCi (sNCj ). Notice that:
1. If i < 0 and DNCi < 0, then s
C
i (sj) rotates clockwise and s
NC
j < sj. Then, s
C
i (sj) >
sNCi (sj) for all sj < sj, including s
NC
j (see gure 1a).
2. If i > 0 and DNCi > 0, then s
C
i (sj) rotates anticlockwise and s
NC
j > sj, as in gure 1b
Then, sCi (sj) > s
NC
i (sj) for all sj > sj, including s
NC
j .
Therefore,

i DNCi
 sCi (sNCj )  sNCi (sNCj ) > 0.
Thus, lemma A species a ranking for player is best response functions when evaluated
at sj = sNCj . In particular, it determines that s
C
i (s
NC
j ) > s
NC
i (s
NC
j ) if either: (1) player i is
a compensator using a relatively demanding distance function, i < 0 and DNCi < 0; or if
(2) player i is a reciprocator using a not-demanding distance function, i > 0 and DNCi > 0.
With this interesting result, we can now prove Proposition 2.
First result
From the above Lemma A we know that
i DNCi > 0 =) sCi (sNCj ) > sNCi (sNCj ) = sNCi
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Let us now show that, for a given player js best response function, sCj (si) = s
NC
j (si),
sCi (s
NC
j ) > s
NC
i =) sCi > sNCi
In order to show the above result, assume by contradiction that for a given sNCj (si),
sCi (s
NC
j ) > s
NC
i implies s
C
i < s
NC
i . First, take two negatively sloped best response functions,
and assume sCi < s
NC
i . Then, when evaluated at sj = s
NC
j , player is best response function
must satisfy sCi (s
NC
j ) < s
NC
i (s
NC
j ) = s
NC
i , which is a contradiction. Thus, if s
C
i (s
NC
j ) > s
NC
i
then sCi > s
NC
i . Therefore, for a given s
NC
j (si), and using Lemma A we have that
i DNCi > 0 =) sCi (sNCj ) > sNCi =) sCi > sNCi
Second result
From Lemma A we know that
j DNCj < 0 =) sCj (sNCi ) < sNCj (sNCi )
Then, we now want to show that if sCj (s
NC
i ) < s
NC
j (s
NC
i ) is satised, then
sCi > s
NC
i when s
NC
i (sj) is negatively sloped
and sCi < s
NC
i otherwise. Then, assume that s
C
j (s
NC
i ) < s
NC
j (s
NC
i ) and that s
C
j (si) is
negatively sloped. Therefore, sCj (si) < s
NC
j (si) for all si > si, including s
NC
i . Since, in
addition, sCj (si) must cross s
NC
i (sj) from below by assumption 3, then s
C
i > s
NC
i . Similarly,
when jDNCj > 0 holds and playersbest response functions have positive slope,
UCsisj
UCsisi
< 0,
then we have an analog reasoning,
j DNCj > 0 =) sCj (sNCi ) > sNCj (sNCi ) from Lemma A
Therefore, sCj (s
NC
i ) > s
NC
j (s
NC
i ) for all si < si, including s
NC
i . Finally, assumption 2 for the
context of positively sloped best response functions implies that sCj (si) must cross s
NC
i (sj)
from above. Hence, sCi > s
NC
i .
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5.2.5 Proof of Proposition 3
From Lemma A above we know that
DNC > 0 =) sCi (sNCj ) > sNCi (sNCj ) for all i 6= j
Now we want to show that,
sCi (s
NC
j ) > s
NC
i for all i 6= j =) sCi > sNCi for all i = f1; 2g
In order to show the above claim, assume by contradiction that sCi (s
NC
j ) > s
NC
i (s
NC
j )
holds for all i 6= j but sCi < sNCi for at least some i. For simplicity, let us take two best
response functions with negative slopes, and consider that sCi < s
NC
i . Then, when evaluated
at sj = sNCj , s
C
i (s
NC
j ) must be below s
NC
i (s
NC
j ). Applying the same reasoning to player j,
we conclude that
sCi (s
NC
j ) < s
NC
i (s
NC
j ) and s
C
j (s
NC
i ) < s
NC
j (s
NC
i )
which is a contradiction. Therefore, if sCi (s
NC
j ) > s
NC
i (s
NC
j ) for all i 6= j, then sCi > sNCi for
all i = f1; 2g. Thus, using Lemma A we have that
DNC > 0 =) sCi (sNCj ) > sNCi =) sCi > sNCi
5.2.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Using Segal and Sobel (1999), we know that the second movers preferences over the rst
movers actions can be represented by
UCsi (si; sj) = iU
NC
i (si; sj) + jU
NC
j (si; sj) where i; j 2 R
if preferences satisfy continuity and independence, as well as Segal and Sobels (1999)
condition (F) which states that
if UNCi (s
0
i; sj) = U
NC
i (si; sj) , then s
0
i i si (F)
which are all satised in our model.
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5.2.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Both players are asked to simultaneously submit their voluntary contributions to the public
good. Fixing subject js contribution, sj, we have that
si(sj) =
8>>><>>>:
+m
1++m
w if sj = 0
+m
1++m
w +  m
(+m)(1++m)
sj if sj 2

0; (+m)
2
m 
i
0 if sj 2

(+m)2
m  ;+1

if  < m. In contrast, when  > m si(sj) does not become zero or negative for any value of
sj. The corresponding best response function for player i in this case is
si(sj) =
8<: +m1++mw if sj = 0+m
1++m
w +  m
(+m)(1++m)
sj if sj > 0
Regarding the equilibrium contributions, note that symmetry eliminates corner solutions
in this case. Hence, the only equilibrium contribution is that resulting from the crossing
point of player is and js best response functions (interior solution). Solving for si and sj
in a system of two equations, we obtain sCi =
(+m)2w
2m+(+m)2
, as the interior Nash equilibrium
contribution level.
Finally, if both players are equally not concerned about status, i = j = 0, we obtain
the interior solution in standard public good games, where every player is Nash equilibrium
contribution level is given by sNCi =
mw
2+m
.
5.2.8 Proof of Corollary 1
Recall that player is equilibrium contribution in the model without status acquisition is
sNCi =
mw
2+m
. Comparing it with the equilibrium contribution level in the model with status
considerations, sCi =
(+m)2w
2m+(+m)2
,
sCi   sNCi =
(+m)2w
2m+ (+m)2
  mw
2 +m
=
2(+ 2m)w
(2 +m)

2m+ (+m)2

which is positive for any  > 0, reecting that sCi > s
NC
i .
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5.2.9 Proof of Proposition 6
In this public good game, both players are asked to simultaneously submit their contribu-
tions. Fixing player js contribution, sj, player is utility maximization problem becomes
max
si
[w   si]0:5 +
h
m(si + sj) + 

sj   srefj
i0:5
And the argument that maximizes this utility function gives us
sCi (sj) =
8>>>><>>>>:
srefj +m
2w
m(1+m)
if sj = 0
srefj +m
2w
m(1+m)
  +m
m(1+m)
sj if sj 2

0;
srefj +m
2w
+m(2+m)

0 if sj >
srefj +m
2w
+m(2+m)
Since
srefj +m
2w
m(1+m)
  +m
m(1+m)
sj = 0 at exactly sj =
srefj +m
2w
+m(2+m)
. Hence, sCi (sj) becomes
sCi (sj) =
8><>:
srefj +m
2w
m(1+m)
  +m
m(1+m)
sj if sj 2

0;
srefj +m
2w
+m(2+m)

0 if sj >
srefj +m
2w
+m(2+m)
5.2.10 Proof of Proposition 7
By symmetry, player i and js best response functions can only cross each other at interior
points. Therefore, there must be a unique and interior Nash equilibrium contribution level
for every player, which we can obtain by plugging player js best response function into
player is. In particular,
sCi =
srefj +m
2w
m(1 +m)
  +m
m(1 +m)
 
srefj +m
2w
m(1 +m)
  +m
m(1 +m)
sCi
!
Solving for sCi , we have s
C
i =
srefj +m
2w
+m(2+m)
.
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5.2.11 Proof of Corollary 2
Recall that player is equilibrium contribution in the model where players do not assign value
to distances is sNCi =
mw
2+m
. On the other hand, by comparing the equilibrium contribution
level when distances are considered, sCi , obtained in the above proposition 7 with respect to
sNCi ,
sCi   sNCi =
srefj +m
2w
+m(2 +m)
  mw
2 +m
=

h
srefj (2 +m mw)
i
(2 +m) [+m (2 +m)]
and this di¤erence is positive if and only if sNCj =
mw
2+m
< srefj . Hence, s
C
i > s
NC
i if and only
if DNCi  

sNCj   srefj

< 0, which is satised for any srefj such that s
NC
j =
mw
2+m
< srefj
Otherwise, if sNCj =
mw
2+m
> srefj holds, then this di¤erence is negative. However, if
mw
2+m
> srefj and  < 0 are simultaneously satised, then this di¤erence is positive, and
sCi > s
NC
i .
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5.3 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
5.3.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Both players are asked to simultaneously submit their voluntary contributions to the public
good. Fixing subject js contribution, gj, we have that
gi(gj) =
8>>><>>>:
1 if gj = 0
1 + i m
i+m
gj if gj 2

0; m+i
m i
i
0 if gj 2

m+i
m i ;+1

if i < m. Note that
0  1 + i  m
i +m
gj () gj  m+ i
m  i
and this threshold is positive if i < m, see gure 1(a). In contrast, when i > m this
threshold is never binding for any positive gj, i.e., gi does not become zero or negative for
any positive value of gj, see gure 1(b). The corresponding best response function for player
i in this case is
gi(gj) =
8<: 1 if gj = 01 + i m
i+m
gj if gj > 0
5.3.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Di¤erentiating gi(gj) with respect to i, we have
2mgj
[i (gi   gj) +m (gi + gj)]2
which is strictly positive, for any parameter values.
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5.3.3 Proof of Proposition 1
First, take a given player is best response function, gi(gj). Then, gSmi = 1 only when: (1) the
slope of player js best response function, gj(gi), is smaller than -1, and (2) the horizontal
intercept of player is best response function, gi(gj), is higher than 1. Otherwise, both
playersbest response functions would cross each other in an interior point. The intuition of
these two conditions is represented in the following gure.
gi
gj
1
m
m
i
i
+
-
a
a
i
i
m
m
a
a
-
+
gi(gj)
1
gj(gi)
j
j
m
m
a
a
-
+
m
m
j
j
+
-
a
a
Figure 28: Both playersbest response functions
That is, gSmi = 1 if and only if
j  m
j +m
  1() j  0, and m+ i
m  i  1() i > 0
Since i; j  0, the above conditions on player i and js concerns about status are
i  0 and j = 0. Hence, gSmi = 1 if and only if i  0 and j = 0.
Secondly, gSmi = 0 only when the opposite happens. That is, when i = 0 and j > 0.
Finally, when none of the above cases is satised, i.e., when i > 0 and j > 0, then
we have an interior solution. Solving for gi and gj in a system of two equations, we obtain
gSmi =
i(j+m)
(i+j)m
, as the interior Nash equilibrium contribution level.
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Su¢ ciency
Let us now check that the second order conditions of incentive compatibility are satised.
Suppose all but player i submit a contribution to the public good according to the above
equilibrium prediction. I next show that, for any i, contributor i maximizes his utility by
following gSmi . Let
U (g; i) = w   gi + ln

m(gi + g
Sm
j ) + i
 
gi   gSmj

be the utility level of player i when contributing g to the public good, and having a concern
i about status acquisition. We must now show that the derivative Ug (g; i)  0 for all g <
gSmi , and Ug (g; i)  0 for all g > gSmi , which imply that U (g; i) is indeed maximized at
exactly g = gSmi .
Di¤erentiating U (g; i) with respect to g,
Ug (g; i) =  1 + i +m
i
 
g   gSmj

+m(g + gSmj )
Let us now suppose that g < gSmi (i), and denote ~i to be the concern about status for
which the equilibrium contribution is exactly g, i.e., gSmi (~i) = g. Since g
Sm
i (i) is strictly
increasing in i (as one can check from the suggested equilibrium contribution gSmi , and
conrmed in lemma 4) this implies that gSmi (i) > g
Sm
i (~i) if and only i > ~i. Then,
Ug (g; ~i)  Ug (g; i). Since by denition, gSmi (~i) = g, it implies that Ug (g; ~i) = 0.
Hence, Ug (g; i)  0 for all g < gSmi . By a similar argument, Ug (g; i)  0 for all g > gSmi .
Therefore, U (g; i) is maximized at g = gSmi .
5.3.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Di¤erentiating gSmi with respect to i, we obtain
@gSmi
@i
=
8>>><>>>:
0 if i > 0 and j = 0
j(j+m)
(i+j)
2m
if i > 0 and j > 0
0 if i = 0 and j > 0
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which is weakly positive for any parameter values. On the other hand, di¤erentiating gSmi
with respect to j, we obtain
@gSmi
@j
=
8>>><>>>:
0 if i > 0 and j = 0
i(i+m)
(i+j)
2m
if i > 0 and j > 0
0 if i = 0 and j > 0
which is weakly positive for any parameter values. Finally, di¤erentiating gSmi with respect
to j, we obtain
@gSmi
@j
=
8>>><>>>:
0 if i > 0 and j = 0
  ii
(i+j)m2
if i > 0 and j > 0
0 if i = 0 and j > 0
which is weakly negative for any parameter values.
5.3.5 Proof of Lemma 4
If i > 0 and j = 0, then from proposition 1 we know that gSmi = 1 and g
Sm
j = 0. Hence,
GSm = 1. If, on the contrary, i = 0 and j  0, then from proposition 1 we also know
that gSmi = 0 and g
Sm
j = 1. Hence, G
Sm = 1 as well. Finally, if i > 0 and j = 0, then
gSmi =
i(j+m)
(i+j)m
, and similarly for player j, what leads to GSm = 1 + 2ij
(i+j)m
.
5.3.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Using the second movers best response function, gj(gi), from lemma 1, we know that if
j < m,
gj(gi) =
8>>><>>>:
1 if gi = 0
1 +
j m
j+m
gi if gi 2

0;
m+j
m j
i
0 if gj 2

m+j
m j ;+1

And if j > m,
gj(gi) =
8<: 1 if gi = 01 + j m
j+m
gi if gi 2 (0;+1)
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Regarding player i, we know that he inserts the above best response function of the
follower into his utility function,
Ui = w   gi + ln [m(gi + gj(gi)) + i (gi   gj(gi))]
which is maximized at
gSeqi =
8<: 0 if i 2 [0; i]ij+3im+jm m2
2m(i+j)
if i 2 (i;+1)
where i =
m(m j)
3m+j
Given the above contribution of the rst donor and gj(gi) specied above, player j submits
an equilibrium contribution of
gSeqj =
8>>><>>>:
1 if i 2 [0; i)
1
2

ij
(i+j)m
+ m
i+j
+
4j
j+m
  1

if i 2 [i; ^i)
0 if i 2 [^i;+1)
if j < m. Clearly, note that when player js best response function is negative, i.e.,
j < m, player j submits no positive contribution if 1   i mi+mgj 
m+j
m j , or in equilibrium,
when i  ^i, where ^i = m(3
2
j+m
2)
 2j 4jm+m2
On the other hand, if player js best response function is positive, j > m, player j
submits
gSeqj =
8<: 1 if i 2 [0; i)1
2

ij
(i+j)m
+ m
i+j
+
4j
j+m
  1

if i 2 [i;+1)
Clearly, the above two expressions for gSeqj can be simplied to
gSeqj =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 if i 2 [0; i) ;
1
2

ij
(i+j)m
+ m
i+j
+
4j
j+m
  1

if j< m and i2 [i; ^i) ,
or if j> m and i 2 [i;+1);
0 if j < m and i 2 [^i;+1)
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5.3.7 Proof of Corollary 1
First result: From proposition 2, we know that player i submits strictly positive contributions
if and only if i >
m(m j)
3m+j
. Then, if i = 0, the former condition can only be satised if
0 >
m (m  j)
3m+ j
() j > m
Second result: Since  = m(m j)
3m+j
< m, for any j  0, then if m < i we must have
 < m < i for any j  0. Therefore,  < i, and player i submits a strictly positive
contribution for any concern about status player j may have, j  0.
5.3.8 Proof of Lemma 5
Di¤erentiating gSeqi with respect to i, we obtain
@gSeqi
@i
=
8<: 0 if i 2 [0; i](j+m)2
2(i+j)
2m
if i > i
which is weakly positive for any parameter values. On the other hand, di¤erentiating gSeqi
with respect to j, we obtain
(i m)2
2(i+j)
2m
@gSeqi
@j
=
8<: 0 if i 2 [0; i](i m)2
2(i+j)
2m
if i > i
which is weakly positive for any parameter values.
5.3.9 Proof of Lemma 6
We must nd the set of parameter values under which player is contribution is above that
of player j in this sequential game. Specically, manipulating both expressions, we nd that
gSeqi  gSeqj () i 
2j +m
2
2m
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5.3.10 Proof of Lemma 7
Di¤erentiating gj(gi) with respect to gi, we have
j m
j+m
, which is positive if j > m. Otherwise,
if j < m, gj(gi) decreases in gi. On the other hand, di¤erentiating Ui with respect to gj we
obtain
 i +m
i (gi   gj) +m (gi + gj)
which is negative if i > m. Otherwise, if i < m, Ui increases in gj.
5.3.11 Proof of Lemma 8
When i < i, we know from proposition 2 that player i does not contribute, but player j
responds submitting a contribution of gSeqj = 1. This is valid both when j < m and when
j < m. Then, GSeq = 1.
In contrast, when i 2 [i^i) and j < m (or when i 2 [i +1) and j > m) from
proposition 2 we know that player i submits gSeqi =
ij+3im+jm m2
2m(i+j)
while player j responds
by submitting
gSeqj =
1
2

ij
(i + j)m
+
m
i + j
+
4j
j +m
  1

Then, the total contributions when i > i adds up to GSeq =
2j
j+m
+
i(j+m)
(i+j)m
Finally, if i 2 [i +1) and j < m, from proposition 2 we know that player i submits
gSeqi =
ij+3im+jm m2
2m(i+j)
and player j does not submit any positive contribution (since his
best response function is positively sloped and, for these parameter values, it crosses the
gi-axis), what implies GSeq =
ij+3im+jm m2
2m(i+j)
.
5.3.12 Proof of Lemma 9
Regarding player i, the di¤erence between his equilibrium contribution in the simultaneous
and sequential game is
(i  m) (j  m)
2 (i + j)m
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which is positive if either i > m and j > m, or if i < m and j < m. Hence, if i > m
and j > m (or if i < m and j < m), then gSmi > g
Seq
i . Regarding player j, the di¤erence
between his equilibrium contribution in the simultaneous and sequential game is
(i  m) (j  m)2
2 (i + j)m (j  m)
which is positive if and only if i > m. Hence, if i > m, gSmj > g
Seq
j .
5.3.13 Proof of Proposition 3
Applying proposition 1 of Romano and Yildirim (2001), we know that whenever 1+ @gj(gi)
@gi
>
0, the sign of
@Ui
@gj
@gj(gi)
@gi
and GSeq  GSm
coincide. Let us then rst nd 1+ @gj(gi)
@gi
. In particular, 1+ @gj(gi)
@gi
= 1+
j m
j+m
which is positive
for any j > 0. On the other hand, from corollary 1, we know that for any i; j = f1; 2g
where j 6= i
@Ui
@gj
@gj(gi)
@gi
=
8<: > 0 if i < m and j > m,< 0 otherwise
Therefore, if i < m and j > m, for all i; j = f1; 2g and j 6= i, then
@Ui
@gj
@gj(gi)
@gi
> 0 and GSeq > GSm
and if i > m and j > m (or if i < m and j < m), then
@Ui
@gj
@gj(gi)
@gi
< 0 and GSeq < GSm
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5.3.14 Proof of Lemma 10
When seniority in status is considered, player is utility maximization problem becomes
max
gi
w   gi + ln [m(gi + gj) + i (Si + gi   gj)]
Di¤erentiating with respect to gi, setting it equal to zero, and solving for gi, we obtain
1  iSi
i+m
+ i m
i mgj. Hence, player is best response function is
gi(gj) =
8>>><>>>:
1  iSi
i+m
if gj = 0
1  iSi
i+m
+ i m
i mgj if gj 2 [0; iSi i mi m ]
0 if gj >
iSi i m
i m
where 1  iSi
i+m
+ i m
i mgj = 0 at exactly gj =
iSi i m
i m . In particular, note that
iSi i m
i m > 0
if and only if Si > 1.
5.3.15 Proof of Proposition 4
First, take a given player is best response function, gi(gj). Then, g
Sm;Sen
i = 1   iSii+m only
when: (1) the slope of player js best response function, gj(gi), is smaller than -1, and (2)
the horizontal intercept of player is best response function, gi(gj), is higher than 1  jSjj+m .
Otherwise, both playersbest response functions would cross each other in an interior point.
Therefore, gSm;Seni = 1  iSii+m if and only if
j  m
j +m
  1() j 0, and
iSi   i  m
i  m  1 
jSj
j +m
() i jSjm
j (Si + Sj   2) + (Si   2)m
Since i; j  0, the above conditions on player i and js concerns about status are
i  jSjmj(Si+Sj 2)+(Si 2)m and j = 0. Secondly, g
Sm;Sen
i = 0 when the opposite happens. That
is, when i = 0 and j  iSimi(Sj+Si 2)+(Sj 2)m . Finally, when both i 
jSjm
j(Si+Sj 2)+(Si 2)m
and j  iSimi(Sj+Si 2)+(Sj 2)m , we have an interior solution. Solving for gi and gj in a system
of two equations, we obtain
gSm;Seni =
jSjm  i [j (Si + Sj   2) +m (Si   2)]
2 (i + j)m
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Therefore,
gSm;Seni =
8>>><>>>:
1  iSi
i+m
if i  ~i and j  0
jSjm i[j(Si+Sj 2)+m(Si 2)]
2(i+j)m
if i  ~i and j  ~j
0 if i  0 and j  ~j
where ~i =
jSjm
j(Si+Sj 2)+(Si 2)m and ~j =
iSim
i(Sj+Si 2)+(Sj 2)m .
5.3.16 Proof of Lemma 11
Di¤erentiating gSm;Seni with respect to Si,
@gSm;Seni
@Si
=   i (j +m)
2 (i + j)m
which is negative for all parameter values. Similarly, di¤erentiating gSm;Seni with respect to
Sj, we have
@gSm;Seni
@Sj
=
j (m  i)
2 (i + j)m
which is negative if and only if m < i.
5.3.17 Proof of Proposition 5
Using the second movers best response function, gj(gi), from lemma 10, we know that
gi(gj) =
8>>><>>>:
1  jSj
j+m
if gi = 0
1  jSj
j+m
+
j m
j mgj if gi 2 [0;
jSj j m
j m ]
0 if gi >
jSj j m
j m
Regarding player i, we know that he inserts the above best response function into his
utility function,
Ui = w   gi + ln [m(gi + gj(gi)) + i (Si + gi   gj(gi))]
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and di¤erentiating with respect to gi, and solving for gi we obtain the following optimal
contribution
gSeq;Seni =
8<: 0 if i 2 [0; Ai ](j+jSj m)m i[j(Si+Sj 1)+(Si 3)m]
2(j+j)m
if i > Ai
where Ai =
(j+jSj m)m
j(Si+Sj 1)+(Si 3)m . Given the above contribution of the rst mover, we can now
use gj(gi) to nd player js equilibrium contribution.
gSeq;Senj =
8>>><>>>:
1  jSj
j+m
if i 2 [0; Ai ]
1
2
h
m
i+j
+
4j
j+m
  i+j iSi+jSj
(i+j)m
  ij(Si+Sj 4)
i+j
i
if i 2

Ai ; 
B
i

0 if i > Bi
where Ai =
(j+jSj m)m
j(Si+Sj 1)+(Si 3)m and 
B
i =
m(m2 (Sj 3)2j jSjm)
2j (Si+Sj 1)+mj(Sj 4) m2(Si 1)
.
5.3.18 Proof of Lemma 12
Di¤erentiating gSeq;Seni and g
Seq;Sen
j with respect to Si and Sj, respectively, we obtain
@gSm;Seni
@Si
=   i (j +m)
2 (i + j)m
, and
@gSm;Senj
@Sj
=   j (i +m)
2 (i + j)m
which are negative for all parameter values. Similarly, di¤erentiating gSeq;Seni and g
Seq;Sen
j
with respect to Sj and Si, respectively, we have
@gSm;Seni
@Sj
=
j (m  i)
2 (i + j)m
, and
@gSm;Senj
@Si
=
i (m  j)
2 (i + j)m
which are negative if and only if m < i and m < j respectively.
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5.3.19 Proof of Proposition 6
Applying Romano and Yildirim (2001), we know that whenever 1 + @gj(gi)
@gi
> 0, the sign of
@Ui
@gj
@gj(gi)
@gi
and GSeq  GSm
coincide. Let us then rst nd 1 + @gj(gi)
@gi
. In particular, 1 + @gj(gi)
@gi
= 1 +
j m
j+m
which is
positive for any j > 0. On the other hand,
@Ui
@gj
=
 i +m
i (Si + gi   gj) +m (gi + gj)
which is negative if and only if i > m. Then, from corollary 1, we know that for any j 6= i
@Ui
@gj
@gj(gi)
@gi
=
8<: > 0 if i < m and j > m,< 0 otherwise
Therefore, if i < m and j > m, for all j 6= i, then
@Ui
@gj
@gj(gi)
@gi
> 0 and GSeq > GSm
and if i > m and j > m (or if i < m and j < m), then
@Ui
@gj
@gj(gi)
@gi
< 0 and GSeq < GSm
110
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Akerlof, George A. (1982) Labor contracts and partial gift exchange,Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 97(4), pp. 543-69.
[2] Andreoni, James, Paul M. Brown and Lise Vesterlund (2002) What makes
an allocation fair? Some experimental evidence,Games and Economic Behavior, 40,
pp. 1-24.
[3] Ball, S, C. Eckel, P. Grossman, and W. Zame (2001), Status in Markets,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 116: 161-188.
[4] Ball S. and C. Eckel (1998), The Economic Value of Status, Journal of Socio-
Economics, 27, 495-514.
[5] Bereby-Meyer, Yoella and Muriel Niederle (2005) Fairness in bargaining,
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol.56, pp. 173-186.
[6] Blanco, Mariana, Dirk Englemann and Hanss-Theo Normann (2007) A
within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences,Royal Holloway College, Uni-
versity of London, working paper.
[7] Bolton, Gary E. and Axel Ockenfels (2000) ERC: A theory of equity, reci-
procity, and competition,American Economic Review, 90, pp. 166-93.
[8] Brandts, Jordi and Carles Solà (2001) Reference points and negative reciprocity
in simple sequential games,Games and Economic Behavior, 36, pp. 138-57.
[9] Charness, Gary and Matthew Rabin (2002) Understanding social preferences
with simple tests,Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol. 117(3), pp. 817-869.
[10] Congleton, D. Roger (1989) E¢ cient status seeking: externalities and the evolu-
tion of status games,Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 11, 175-190.
[11] Cox, James C. (2001) On the economics of reciprocity,University of Arizona, work-
ing paper.
[12] Cox, James C. (2003) Trust and Reciprocity: implications of game triads and social
contexts,University of Arizona, working paper.
111
[13] Cox, James C., Daniel Friedman and Vjollca Sadiraj (2007) Revealed altru-
ism,Econometrica, forthcoming.
[14] Dixit, Avinash (1987) Strategic Behavior in Contests,American Economic Review,
77, 891-898.
[15] Duffy, John and Tatiana Kornienko (2005) Does competition a¤ect giving? An
Experimental study,University of Pittsburgh, working paper.
[16] Dufwenberg, Martin and Georg Kirchsteiger (2004) A theory of sequential
reciprocity,Games and Economic Behavior, 47, pp. 268-298.
[17] Falk, Armin, Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher (2003) On the nature of fair
behavior,Economic Inquiry, 41(1), pp. 20-26.
[18] Falk, Armin and Urs Fischbacher (2006) A theory of reciprocity,Games and
Economic Behavior, 54, pp. 293-315.
[19] Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gachter (2000) Fairness and retaliation: the economics
of reciprocity,Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, pp. 159-81.
[20] Fehr, Ernst and Klaus Schmidt (1999) A theory of fairness, competition and
cooperation,Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 817-68.
[21] Fehr, Ernst, Georg Kirchsteiger and Arno Reidl (1993) Does fairness pre-
vent market clearing? An experimental investigation,Quarterly Journal of Economics,
108, pp. 437-60.
[22] Festinger, Leon (1954) A theory of social comparison processes,Human Relations,
7, 117-40.
[23] Frank, R. H. (1985) Choosing the right pond: human behavior and the quest for status.
Oxford University Press.
[24] Guth, Werner, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze (1982) An ex-
perimental analysis on ultimatum bargaining,Journal of Economic Behavior and Or-
ganization, 3: pp. 367-88.
[25] Hopkins, Ed and Tatiana Kornienko (2004), Running to keep the same place:
consumer choice as a game of status,American Economic Review, 94 (4), 1085-1107.
[26] Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1979) Prospect Theory: an analysis of
decision under risk,Econometrica, 47(2), pp. 263-92.
[27] Köszegi, Botond and Mathew Rabin (2007) A model of reference-dependent
preferences,Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
112
[28] Krueger, Alan B. and Lawrence H. Summers (1988) E¢ ciency wages and inter-
industry wage di¤erentials,Econometrica, 56, pp. 256-93.
[29] Kumru, C. and L. Vesterlund (2005), The e¤ect of status on voluntary contri-
butions,University of Pittsburgh, working paper.
[30] Loomes, Graham and Robert Sugden (1982) Regret theory: an alternative the-
ory of rational choice under uncertainty,Economic Journal, 92: pp. 805-24.
[31] Mas, Alexandre (2006) Pay, Reference points, and police performance,Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 121(3), pp. 783-821.
[32] Morgan, John (2000), Financing public goods by menas of lotteries, Review of
Economic Studies, 67, 761-784.
[33] Potters, J., M. Sefton, and L. Vesterlund (2005), After you Endogenous
sequencing in voluntary contribution games, Journal of Public Economics, 89, 1399-
1419.
[34] Rabin, Matthew (1993) Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics,
American Economic Review, vol. 83, no 5, pp. 1281-1302.
[35] Romano, R. and H. Yildirim (2001). Why charities announce donations: a positive
perspective,Journal of Public Economics, 81, pp.423-47.
[36] Segal, Uzi and Joel Sobel (1999) Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for
Reciprocity in Strategic Settings,University of Western Ontario, Department of Eco-
nomics.
[37] Smith, A. (1759) The Theory of Moral Sentiments, London, A. Millar.
[38] Suls, Jerry, Rene Martin, and Ladd Wheeler (2002) Social Comparison: why,
with whom, and with what e¤ect?,Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11,
159-163.
[39] Varian, Hal (1994) Sequential contributions to public goods, Journal of Public
Economics, 53(2), pp. 165-186.
[40] Veblen, T. (1899) The Theory of the Leisure Class: an Economic Study of Institutions
Penguin Classics.
113
